

EPIC



Lieutenant General (Ret.) Ben HODGES

THE DECISIVE TERRAIN FOR THIS WAR IS CRIMEA

HOW DOES "PRESENCE,
POSTURE AND PROFILE"
INFLUENCE AN OPERATION?

Lieutenant Colonel Edouard THWAITES

THE POLISH MILITARY IN THE ZEITENWENDE

Lieutenant General Sławomir WOJCIECHOWSKI




EUROCORPS



A FORCE FOR
THE EUROPEAN UNION
AND NATO

JUNE 2023



This publication aims to share thought-provoking op-eds featuring both transatlantic and EU viewpoints on current themes. I wish you an epic read!

A stylized, handwritten signature in dark blue ink, consisting of several overlapping loops and horizontal strokes.

Peter DEVOGELAERE

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EDITORIAL

COLONEL PETER HUBRECHT

CHIEF PUBLIC AFFAIRS



Dear Readers,

For over 30 years, EUROCORPS has been a steadfast contributor to both NATO and European Union military operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, Afghanistan, Mali and the Central African Republic. EUROCORPS' capability to act and operate largely independently for both NATO and the EU is the headquarters' raison d'être. It is this duality that makes EUROCORPS unique among its peers within the NATO Force Structure.

EUROCORPS' training programs for both NATO and EU roles are well-balanced, designed to plan and execute missions across the intensity spectrum. Training for one role constructively complements the others. A prime example is the preparation and training for the NATO Joint Task Force HQ 2024 role, which leverages the knowledge and experience gained for the EU Rapid Deployment Capacity (RDC) Force HQ in 2025.

Today, the challenges created by Russia's unprovoked attack on Ukraine are a catalyst for a tightening of alliances and increased multinational military cooperation. In the context of a rapidly changing security environment in Europe, unity and resolve among nations are more crucial than ever. EUROCORPS has always been able to rely on exquisite cooperation and close ties with its Framework Nations – Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg, Spain and Poland – as well as Associated Nations Austria, Greece, Italy, Romania and Türkiye.

This issue of EPIC magazine is intended to serve as an international forum for the exchange of current opinions, ideas and highlights. To be read in conjunction with the upcoming seminar "EU-NATO Duality in Europe's new security environment", it aims to engage international contributors and readers on military issues in an evolving strategic context.

The editor and authors of this issue would be remiss not to mention that the Commanding Officer, Lieutenant General Peter DEVOGELAERE, is handing over command to his successor from Poland. We wish General DEVOGELAERE a happy Farewell to Arms and the incoming Lieutenant General Jarosław GROMADZIŃSKI every success in his new position.

We stand confident that EUROCORPS is ready to meet the security challenges of a changing and uncertain world.

Most respectfully,



POLAND

At the invitation of the Chief of Defence of Poland, General Rajmund T. ANDRZEJCZAK, the Commanding General of EUROCORPS paid a visit to Warsaw on 28-29 March. Europe, and Poland in particular, has opened its borders to Ukrainian refugees fleeing Russia's military aggression, and Poland has taken in the largest number of refugees from the war-torn country.



EUROPEAN UNION TRAINING MISSION TEAMS

Following the redeployment of the European Union Training Mission Teams in 2022, EUROCORPS swiftly focused on a Joint Force Headquarters concept.



COMMAND POST EXERCISE 2022

The "COMMON" exercise series culminated in a challenging Command Post Exercise in preparation for EUROCORPS' next NATO role as a Joint Force Headquarters in 2024.

¹ General Stanley McChrystal (US Army, Ret.) former Commander of U.S. and International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) Afghanistan and the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC), New York Times best-selling author of "My Share of the Task" and "Team of Teams".



FOREWORD COMMANDER

LIEUTENANT GENERAL PETER DEVOGELAERE

In the fast-moving world of today and tomorrow, it seemed like the day before yesterday when EUROCORPS' NATO Response Force 20 was fighting the invisible enemy COVID-19. It seemed like yesterday when EUROCORPS sent its soldiers to Mali and the Central African Republic in the framework of its European Union Missions. Back then, caution prevailed to address overtly the emerging influence and competition from private military companies and their supporter Russia. Today, the unprovoked and brutal Russian attack on Ukraine has disrupted the existing world order. Brave Ukrainian soldiers are fighting not only for the defence of Europe and our values, but also for the rules-based international order. I am convinced that tomorrow's challenges will only be mastered by those who are prepared, those who respond swiftly based upon their readiness and will. The future belongs to those who adapt better and faster and those who embrace technological progress.

Team of Teams' disclosed. Organisations that do not adapt will simply fade. During my tenure at EUROCORPS Headquarters, I relied on my "Team of Teams" to be faster, simpler and more flexible than ever. In times of war in Europe, leaders need practical management approaches that can be quickly scaled up to thousands of soldiers. Small groups are given the freedom and responsibilities to act and share what they learn with the whole organisation. Additionally, such teams can react faster, make better plans and decide faster.

EUROCORPS' team of teams has given its best for 2 years, the time of my command. Moreover, I am confident it will continue to do so. At the end of 2023, EUROCORPS will be certified by NATO as a Joint Force Headquarters for a wide range of missions. During the home-based preparatory training period for the latter role, EUROCORPS contingents deployed respectively to Mali and the Central African Republic under the EU banner. Hence, running parallel activities is part of our operational know-how. However, a successful transition from one mission to another largely depends on a robust organisation, stable and experienced personnel, available capabilities in terms of quantity and quality, committed leadership, and a real operational culture. It is there-

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fore no surprise that I identified people, mindset and capability as three key areas for change within the staff. A Peacetime Establishment review took place to ensure sufficient workforce for future commitments, such as a Warfighting Corps beyond 2025 in the context of NATO's "Deterrence and Defence" concept. Mean-

while, during its stand-by period in 2024 as NATO Joint Force Headquarters, EUROCORPS will further benefit from and continue to develop its joint mindset and expertise for its follow-on role as Forces Headquarters leading the European Union Battle Group in 2025. Preparations for all future commitments are well on track. A bigger challenge than developing and improving processes has been the sustainment of existing capabilities and the pursuit of innovation. My staff's focus in this domain was on the resilience of command and control capabilities and the procurement of high-tech and interoperable communication and information systems. A much-needed upgrade or innovation of the latter aspects can only ensure that EUROCORPS remains a unique command and control tool for the benefit of our political instances, whether in the context of NATO or the EU. Being ready to meet the security challenges in our changing and uncertain world is what ultimately matters.

I am very grateful for many reasons. To my personal staff and those in the offices of the Command Group and all Branches, you've been indispensable, indispensable in helping me carry out my responsibilities, and I thank you. The same is true for the Multinational Command Support Brigade, Signal Coy and its specialists. Thank you. I want you all to know that the things that I have most respected and most appreciated are your dignity and your dedication. I am truly proud to be part of this team of teams.



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There is a debate underway in Capitals about whether or not Ukraine should give up Crimea to Russia as part of a negotiated settlement to end this war. Some so-called 'realists' say that the current demographics of Crimea, its strategic importance to Russia, and the potential for a Kremlin 'red line' about Crimea all point towards the futility of Ukraine demanding or attempting to retake Crimea. Some in the Pentagon question whether or not Ukraine can actually eject Russia from Ukraine. Yet, nearly everyone acknowledges that Crimea is legitimately Ukrainian sovereign territory and that Russia illegally annexed it in 2014. So if we are saying that this war is about more than just Ukraine, that it is indeed about preservation of the international rules-based order and about preventing the further spread of Russian aggression against Europe, then it should be unacceptable that Russia be rewarded for its aggression and its blatant disregard for international law by allowing it to keep Crimea. Ukraine cannot give up Crimea and should fight to liberate it.

CRIMEA...THE DECISIVE TERRAIN.

Ukraine could kill every Russian Soldier within 200km of Bakhmut and it would not change the strategic situation. Liberating Crimea changes everything. Ukrainians know that they'll never be safe from a future attack if Russia

Ukraine and the world cannot build a peaceful, democratic and prosperous future when Russia is not finally stopped in attempts to project military power from the Crimean peninsula.



retains Crimea. Crimea is like a dagger pointed at the belly of Ukraine. Russian forces would continue to use Crimea as home for the Black Sea Fleet at Sevastopol, as a launching pad for drones and other weapons being used against civilian targets in Ukraine, as a logistics hub, and as a jumping off point for the next attack on Ukraine. Nor will Ukraine be able to rebuild their economy so long as Russia retains Crimea. Ukraine's economy, especially the export of grain that is needed by millions of people in Africa, the Middle East, and Asia, would never recover if its ports are threatened or blockaded and merchant ships are unable or reluctant to trade there. Russian forces could interdict all Ukrainian ports, disrupting shipping along Black Sea Coast and the Azov Sea if Russia controlled Crimea.

OPERATIONAL CONTEXT.

The Ukrainian General Staff's performance thus far has been remarkable. They have been professional and disciplined, demonstrating an understanding of 'operational art', and maintaining operational security. The General Staff see that they can prevent a major breakthrough of Russian forces just about anywhere with what they have, albeit at significant cost. They have resisted the temptation to pour every new weapon or unit into the fights around Bakhmut, in order to build and train an armored force that could penetrate Russian defences for an ex-


THE DECISIVE TERRAIN FOR THIS WAR IS CRIMEA

pected future decisive operation. This armored force will help isolate Crimea, as a step towards the ultimate liberation of the Crimean Peninsula. In the meantime, they will continue to pound away at Russian logistics and headquarters, setting the conditions for this breakthrough of dense, linear Russian defences.

The Ukrainian objective should be to first isolate Crimea with a combination of long-range precision weapons and armored forces and then, second, striking key targets on the Peninsula, making it untenable for Russian forces, thus compelling them to leave. This, rather than a conventional frontal attack against all Russian defences in the region, will compel the Russians to leave Crimea. Donbas will follow once Crimea is liberated.



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Isolation requires disrupting and then severing the only two Land Lines of Communication (LOC) that connect Crimea to Russia. The first LOC goes over the Kerch Bridge. The second LOC, the so-called “land bridge”, runs from Rostov through Mariupol and Melitopol into Crimea.

Long-range precision fires. Disruption of LOC’s starts with long-range precision fires. Weapons such as the Army Tactical Missile System (ATACM) with a range of 300 km, Gray Eagle drones armed with Hellfire missiles and an endurance of 25 hours, and Ground-Launched Small Diameter Bombs (GLSDB) with a range of 150km would enable Ukraine to strike the “land bridge” in depth, continuously, destroying bridges, logistics hubs, rail connections, headquarters, troop concentrations, and ammunition storage sites. They would simultaneously strike targets on the Crimean Peninsula, including the Russian navy base at Sevastopol, the major logistics hub at Dzhankoy, and the airbase at Saky.

We have learned that precision can defeat mass if given enough time. If the West will provide the necessary long-range precision weapons Ukraine needs in time, Ukraine can liberate Crimea by the end of August.

LAND EFFECT.

Ukraine is building and training an armoured force that could serve as the breakthrough formation for the expected coming counteroffensive. This armoured spearhead would

likely aim for Mariupol or Zaporhizia or Melitopol, with the objective being to sever the “land bridge” and begin the isolation of Crimea. This force should be ready by Summer. It will be built around units equipped with armour which they already possess or which they have captured. Western-provided weapon systems including tanks, Infantry Fighting Vehicles, and self-propelled artillery will make it even more lethal.

MAKING CRIMEA UNTENABLE.

ATACM’s, Gray Eagle, and GLSDB can enable Ukraine to deny Russia the use of Crimea as a logistics hub and as a launching pad for future attacks, Iranian-made drones, missiles delivered by Russian aircraft or ships. It is 300km straight-line distance from Odesa to Sevastopol. If Ukraine had ATACMs now, they could already make Sevastopol unusable for the Black Sea Fleet and they could ensure the Kerch Bridge is never repaired.

This is how Ukraine regains Crimea...by making it untenable for the Russians, thus compelling them to leave.

The West cannot reward Russian aggression by allowing them to keep Crimea and threaten Ukraine. This would undermine the international, rules-based order from which most of the World has benefited since the end of WWII: respect for sovereignty as prescribed in the UN Charter, respect for human rights, and respect for international law.



Lieutenant General (Retired) Ben Hodges, the former Commanding General of US Army Europe, is now Senior Advisor to Human Rights First, a non-profit, nonpartisan international human rights organization based in New York, Washington D.C., and Los Angeles. Prior to joining Human Rights First, he held the Pershing Chair in Strategic Studies at the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA). General Hodges serves as NATO Senior Mentor for Logistics and as Chairman of the GLOBSEC Future Security and Defense Council, he consults for several companies on Europe, NATO, and the European Union, and he is co-author of the book *Future War and the Defence of Europe*, published by Oxford University Press. A native of Quincy, Florida, General Hodges graduated from the United States Military Academy in May 1980 and was commissioned as an Infantry Officer in the US Army. After his first assignment as a Lieutenant in Carlstedt, Germany, he commanded Infantry units at the Company, Battalion, and Brigade levels in the 101st Airborne Division, including the First Brigade Combat Team “Bastogne” in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (2003-2004). His other operational assignments include Chief of Operations for Multi-National Corps-Iraq in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (2005-2006) and Director of Operations, Regional Command South in Kandahar, Afghanistan (2009-2010).

General Hodges has also served in a variety of Joint and Army Staff positions to include Chief of Plans, 2nd Infantry Division in Korea; Aide-de-Camp to the Supreme Allied Commander Europe; Chief of Staff, XVIII Airborne Corps; Director of the Pakistan Afghanistan Coordination Cell on the Joint Staff; Chief of Legislative Liaison for the United States Army; and Commander, NATO Allied Land Command 2012-2014 in Izmir, Turkey. His last military assignment was as Commanding General, United States Army Europe in Wiesbaden, Germany from 2014 to 2017.

He retired from the U.S. Army in January 2018 and lives today with his wife in Frankfurt, Germany.

"EUROCORPS MUST DEMONSTRATE ITS RELEVANCE TO NATO MISSIONS..."

INTERVIEW WITH LIEUTENANT GENERAL CLAUDE VAN DE VOORDE

In 1993, Belgium joined EUROCORPS, which had been founded by France and Germany. An agreement followed later that year, by virtue of which EUROCORPS was admitted to the North-Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) Force Structure. For 30 years, EUROCORPS has conducted various NATO-led multinational exercises and operations. At a time when Europe's security has come under challenge, we met Lieutenant General Claude VAN DE VOORDE, Belgium's Military Representative to the NATO Military Committee since 2020.

Lieutenant General Claude VAN DE VOORDE:

EUROCORPS is a force for the European Union (EU) and NATO. Until now, there clearly has been a duality, but I think it will disappear in the future. For me, NATO and EU Defence are complementary. As an example, NATO is increasingly focusing on Article 5 operations on deterrence and defence of the Euro-Atlantic area (DDA), while Europe is more likely to conduct expeditionary or training missions that are not subject to the restrictions of Article 5. The main threats we currently face are Russia and terrorist groups. Because of the present developments in the East, everyone is now focusing on Article 5, so expeditionary operations are somewhat losing ground. The growing interest in DDA really creates an opportunity for the multinational headquarters of EUROCORPS, especially given the views of some contributing nations such as Poland. Poland is one of the countries on the Eastern flank that already focuses on defence and deterrence. An option for EUROCORPS, for example, could be to cover the Eastern flank in NATO's and the EU's famous 360° defence and deterrence approach.

It is very important to agree on the remit of troops assigned to NATO. EUROCORPS certainly adds value to NATO because it is an operational command, which will be needed more than ever if we want to work on our strengthened posture in the East. EUROCORPS has to decide what role it wants to focus on. For me,



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the current priority is defence and deterrence. Therefore, I recommend that EUROCORPS offer its services to NATO as an operational corps and look beyond European thinking. EUROCORPS must demonstrate its relevance to NATO missions, especially since expeditionary missions sometimes end prematurely due to insufficient support by local authorities or among the population. The difference between EUROCORPS and the other High Readiness Force Headquarters is that EUROCORPS does not have permanently assigned troops. According to the new NATO Force model, troops must be assigned to the corps.

A recent political declaration confirmed the strong will of NATO and the EU to improve their cooperation, especially in light of current events. This now shifts to the military level, where discussions between NATO and the EU are ongoing. These discussions should determine who will do what and how this complementarity will be organised. However, this is a lengthy process. Part of the difficulty lies in the fact that some members of one organisation are not members of the other. Sometimes a crisis like the current war accelerates these discussions, hence the re-

cent political declaration. There is no doubt that improved military cooperation will lead to mutual strengthening: if one side becomes stronger, so will the other.

My key message to EUROCORPS is twofold. I would advise EUROCORPS to prepare as much as possible to contribute to the new NATO Force model, thus becoming a full-fledged operational Headquarters under the auspices of SACEUR. Secondly, I would advise EUROCORPS to reach out to NATO, and especially to SHAPE/SACEUR, to clarify what EUROCORPS stands for and to explain its relevance to NATO. There is not enough awareness about EUROCORPS within NATO, so there is still some work to be done in terms of promotion.

I would like to conclude with a message to the Commanding General of EUROCORPS, Lieutenant General Peter DEVOGELAERE, with whom I studied at the Belgian Military Academy. I wish him all the best for his well-deserved retirement. I congratulate him not only on his great military career, but also on what he has achieved at EUROCORPS.

Questions raised by Cdt Katleen LAMBRECHTS, BEL-AF, ADC to DCOS I&A at EUROCORPS



EUROCORPS Commander Lieutenant General Peter Devogelaere and DG EUMS Vice Admiral Hervé Bléjean.

The security situation faced by Europeans today can be increasingly characterised by evolving threats, complexity and uncertainty.

On a global scale, contested norms, revanchism, strategic competition, climate change, terrorism, cyber and hybrid threats, are increasing instability and volatility in already fragile social and political situations. The return of war on our continent has highlighted the need for the EU to 'have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises'. A key enabler for this capacity is the availability of an effective Headquarters that is prepared to Plan, Command and Control military missions and operations across the full operational intensity spectrum.

In this regard, the EU is developing its Military Planning and Conduct Capability, responsible for the operational planning and conduct of the EU's non-executive military missions. The MPCC currently commands the five EU training missions, namely EUTM Mali, EUTM Mozam-



The coat of arms of the
European Union Military Staff (EUMS)

conduct military missions and operations across the full operational and intensity spectrum. It had led EU and NATO military missions and operations within and beyond our borders to protect the Union and its citizens from modern threats in a complex and volatile world.

Since its official established in Strasbourg under the command of German Lieutenant-General Helmut Willmann on 1 October 1993, and especially since it was declared fully operational in 1995, EUROCORPS has justified its reputation as one of Europe's most engaged and experienced Corps Headquarters.

EUROCORPS' goal was to create a military Headquarters that could make a concrete contribution to the security of Europe by providing a multinational Army Corps Headquarters that now includes France, Germany, Belgium, Spain, Luxembourg and most recently, Poland. In addition to this Austria, Greece, Italy, Romania and Türkiye are Associated Nations of EUROCORPS.

EUROCORPS is well respected for its high level of preparedness, military capabilities and performance, not only through its participation in several exercises, but

“A STRONG BOND BETWEEN EUROCORPS AND EUMS”

bique, EUTM RCA, EUTM Somalia and most recently the EU Military Assistance Mission to Ukraine. The EU's Strategic Compass 2022 identifies the MPCC as the preferred military strategic option as the Operational Headquarter (OHQ) for the EU Battle Groups (EU BGs) and the EU Rapid Deployable Capability (RDC), by 2025.

The OHQ is the interface between the political and the military and is responsible for the translating of the EU's political will and direction into military action. It is the responsibility of the FHQ to carry out that action within the mission area. In this regard, the EUMS and indeed the EU is well served by the support it receives from EUROCORPS.

As a multinational, fully deployable and highly autonomous Headquarters, EUROCORPS is able to plan and

in the international operations that it has played a key role in facilitating. Only six years after its foundation, EUROCORPS was assigned the task of leading operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina (SFOR 1998-2000). Since then, EUROCORPS has been engaged in Kosovo (KFOR 2000), Afghanistan (ISAF 2004/2005 and 2012), in the European Union Training Missions in both Mali (2015 and 2021), the Central African Republic (second semester 2016-2017 and 2021), and most recently, a rotation to the Central African Republic (February 2022). In addition to its deployments, EUROCORPS continues its preparation, planning, and transforming towards its role as NATO Joint Headquarters in 2024, and as a Force Headquarters for the European Union Battle-group in 2025.

The EU, through its approval and implementation of its

Strategic Compass, has outlined an ambitious plan of action for strengthening the EU's security and defence policy that will result in an EU that is stronger and a more capable security provider. The ever evolving and persistent uncertain of the EU's security environment has however highlighted the fact EU Member States must work closer with one another if they are to successfully address the security and defence challenges of the future. In addition to greater cooperation between Member States, the Strategic Compass has as a partnership pillar that emphasises the need to strengthen cooperation with strategic partners, specifically NATO and the UN. In this regards, EUROCORPS provides a firm foundation, not only by the manner in which it so successfully integrates staffs from Member States into an effective and cohesive Headquarters, but by the manner in which it can provide this Headquarters to NATO and EU forces.

The relationship EUROCORPS has with the EU, through its interaction with the EUMS and MPCC continues to develop and deepen as the MPCC moves closer towards realising its ambition as the EU's preferred Operational Headquarters. It is however also important to remember that EU defence and security autonomy is not about separating from our transatlantic partner, on the contrary, NATO and EU defence policies and capabilities are complementary.

In this regard, EUROCORPS truly is a force for Europe and its bond with the EUMS and MPCC will undoubtedly go from strength to strength, in the service the EU and its Member States.



Vice Admiral Hervé Bléjean at EUTM RCA, 2022



Vice Admiral Bléjean is double hatted as Director General of the EUMS and Director MPCC.

He has considerable Command and Operational experience having previously served in very senior roles with two EU naval operations; EU NAVFOR ATALANTA and EUNAVFOR Med, Op Sophia. In addition to service within the EU's CSDP, he served within NATO, where he was Head of the NATO Response Force and conducted the operations of the NATO force in Kosovo and the NATO Headquarters in Sarajevo that works in partnership with the European Union operation ALTHEA.

Prior to his current appointment, he was the Deputy Commander of the Allied Maritime Command (MARCOM), Northwood, UK.

He is a graduate of the Staff Course at the Defence College and the Advanced Military Studies at the National Defence Institute, both in Paris.

He will complete his appointment as DG EUMS and Dir MPCC on 28 June 2023.



Brigadier General Jacky Cabo, Mission Force Commander at EUTM RCA 2022

EUROCORPS FROM A ROMANIAN PERSPECTIVE

A reinvigorated CSDP would promote an integrated framework for EU defence co-operation without undermining NATO. As stated in the Joint Declaration on EU-NATO Cooperation signed in January 2023, a stronger NATO and a stronger EU reinforce each other. Together, they can better ensure security in Europe and beyond.

The foundations for this cooperation have been laid and reinforced through several key acts over the past three decades. The SACEUR Agreement of 21 January 1993 allowed EUROCORPS to be placed under NATO command, if necessary, and regulates information exchanges and training between the two partners in peacetime. The SACEUR Agreement was amended in 2002 in conjunction with the certification of EUROCORPS as a High Readiness Force (HRF - Rapid Response Corps). It is upon this foundation that we must build a stronger and more integrated dual deployment framework.

In 2015, Romania joined EUROCORPS and has since continuously reiterated its commitment to the Headquarters. As a proactive NATO member country, Romania reaffirms its belief that a common approach to international security is needed now more than ever. In today's highly volatile geopolitical landscape, no country, no matter how powerful, can afford not to face the dangers arising from a rapidly transforming world. This means that multinational cooperation is imperative. A robust European Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) has likewise become a necessity: The time has come for Europe to strengthen its course of action.

The military must be ready to operate in a more complex, ambiguous, dynamic and restrictive environment in which the human factor is a decisive element. A multinational corps is an outstandingly capable structure for responding to the aforementioned challenges, and trends show that European national and multinational forces are to become increasingly integrated in the medium term. In this endeavor, EUROCORPS is ready to form the nucleus of a European Headquarters.

Lieutenant General Peter Devogelaere, the Commander of EUROCORPS, has taken significant steps to turn these concepts into working principles. Since assuming command of EUROCORPS in 2021, Lieutenant General Devogelaere has made significant efforts to transform EUROCORPS into a higher readiness force and to promote closer cooperation with NATO and its Allies. We are confident that the incoming commander, Lieutenant General Jarosław Gromadziński,



will carry forward this important work during his mandate. His record with the Polish Armed Forces speaks volumes about his commitment and dedication to strengthening security and cooperation. Following his previous position as Commander of the 18th Mechanized Division (also known as the "Iron Division"), a brand new unit in the Polish Armed Forces, Lieutenant General Jarosław Gromadziński has the skills and professionalism to

guide EUROCORPS ever closer to consolidating its relevance in a dynamic and volatile European security environment. Romania is determined to support the work of EUROCORPS from our position as an Associated Nation within EUROCORPS, but more so from our position as a nation that understands well the challenges our Common European Defence will face in the near future.



Lieutenant General Iulian BERDILĂ was appointed Deputy Chief of Defence Staff for Operations and Training on 18 April 2023. During his service, LTG Iulian BERDILĂ completed several assignments from tactical to strategic level, serving as Commander of the 2nd Infantry Battalion, Chief of Staff at the 2nd Infantry Division, Commander of 81st Mechanized Brigade, Head of Strategic Planning Directorate, Commander of Headquarters Multinational Division South-East, and Chief of the Romanian Land Forces Staff. His operational experience includes deployments to the Multi-National Force Iraq as Coalition operations planner and to ISAF Afghanistan as battalion commander with the 1st Mechanized Brigade. LTG BERDILĂ has been inducted as the 77th member of the U.S. Army War College's International fellows hall of fame and he holds a Bachelor of Science degree from the Romanian Land Forces Academy, a Master of Military Arts and Science degree in Theatre Operations from the US Army School of Advanced Military Studies, and a Master of Strategic Studies degree from the US Army War College.



MULTINATIONAL JOINT HEADQUARTERS ULM



As Commander of the MN JHQ Ulm and JSEC, I am in charge of two multinational headquarters, both of which make vital contributions to Europe's security architecture.

NATO's JSEC is responsible for coordinating the deployment and sustainment of all forces subordinate to the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) - throughout the entire Alliance territory, extending from the US East Coast all the way to Europe's eastern flank and from the North Cape down to the Mediterranean.

While the MN JHQ Ulm focusses on EU tasks, we are not only keeping an eye on the current crisis in Eastern Europe but also on other crisis regions world-wide.

MN JHQ ULM - ONE OF FIVE EU MILITARY-STRATEGIC HEADQUARTERS

A German agency with multinational staff, the MN JHQ Ulm is one of five EU military-strategic headquarters, or Operation Headquarters (OHQ), kept on permanent stand-by. When activated by political decision-makers, the "Ulm Command" operates directly below the political level and exercise command and control of the EU' military crisis response forces – the Force HQ and the European Battlegroups (EUBG). As a headquarters with military planning and command and control authority, it supports in advising the EU institutions and the German Ministry of Defense on their decision-making and planning of holistic approaches to crisis resolution.

As one task the MN JHQ Ulm is available as an OHQ to EUBGs on a rotational basis. Several times before, it has functioned as a "preferred" OHQ, most recently for the EU Battlegroup from July

2020 to March 2021. It continues to be available as a military-strategic headquarters.

Furthermore, the Ulm Command supports the EU Military Staff (EUMS) continuously as well as the Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC) on the way to the full operational capability with planning skills and capacities in exercises and – if requested – in the framework of international crisis management.

ULM'S CONTRIBUTION TO THE "STRATEGIC COMPASS"

Due to the changed global challenges, the EU agreed on a fundamental strategic vision in March 2022: The Strategic Compass. It summarizes the intentions and ambitions of the EU's "common foreign and security policy" as being aimed at increasing crisis response capability and operational readiness.

Its military centerpiece is a new rapid response force known



The Wilhelmsburg fortress and the Wilhelmsburg Barracks overlooking Ulm – home of the two headquarters in Southern Germany.
(Photo by PR/PIO MN JHQ Ulm)

LIEUTENANT GENERAL ALEXANDER SOLLFRANK

The Commander, Multinational Joint Headquarters Ulm, and Commander, Joint Support and Enabling Command



(Photo by PR/PIO MN JHQ Ulm)

Lieutenant General Alexander Sollfrank has been assigned as Commander of the Multinational Joint Headquarters Ulm (MN JHQ Ulm) and NATO's Joint Support and Enabling Command (JSEC) since March, 2022. Under his command are ser-

vicemen and women from 25 different nations represented at JSEC, and 7 represented at MN JHQ Ulm. Both multinational headquarters are situated at the Southern German garrison town of Ulm. With JSEC as a NATO headquarters, and the MN JHQ

Ulm predominantly geared towards European Union (EU) tasks, Wilhelmsburg Barracks - where both HQs reside - are no longer just nationally significant, but have become an intersection where the EU and NATO meet.



as “Rapid Deployment Capacity” (RDC). From 2025, there will be 5,000 troops permanently available for a wide array of crisis management activities. In its capacity as framework nation, Germany will provide the core of that force while the MN JHQ Ulm and EUROCORPS assume their designated tasks.

The MN JHQ Ulm is involved in planning and implementing the Strategic Compass, and supports the EU Military Staff in Brussels by providing planning capacities, capabilities and expertise. Tangible examples of this support include hosting of the EUBG 2025 Force Planning Conference with troop-contributing nations in 2022, as well as current efforts to revise potential crisis-management-related EU operational scenarios while considering the present security-political situation around the globe, with a special focus on the Sahel Zone.

EUMAM UKRAINE

The MN JHQ Ulm is ready to temporarily reinforce central command structures in the EU Military Staff, as well as the Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC). To this end, the Ulm Command keeps planning expertise available. This is key for providing support, especially during the time-critical early stages of missions. In late 2022, for example, the Ulm Command gave a planning input to the development and implementation of the European Union Military Assistance Mission Ukraine (EUMAM Ukraine). That training assistance is now underway and subject to expansion and constant adaptation. Along with the United States and the United Kingdom, the EU has assumed a decisive role in training the Ukrainian armed forces.



Multinational networking in EU and NATO - The Commander during a visit of Military Attachés in Ulm in 2022.
(Photo by PR/PIO MN JHQ Ulm)





JOINT SUPPORT AND ENABLING COMMAND

LIEUTENANT GENERAL
ALEXANDER SOLLFRANK

The Commander, Multinational Joint Headquarters Ulm, and Commander, Joint Support and Enabling Command

NATO'S JOINT SUPPORT AND ENABLING COMMAND AT A GLANCE

The NATO headquarters I am in charge of is the Joint Support and Enabling Command (JSEC), located in the city of Ulm, Germany. JSEC is a static operational headquarters with multinational personnel directly subordinate to the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) and his Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) in Mons, Belgium.

Following Russia's annexation of the Crimean Peninsula in 2014, the need for rapid deployment of forces was highlighted at the NATO Summit in Wales. In 2016, at the Warsaw Summit, NATO's command structure was further assessed in the light of an ever-changing security environment. Two years later, at the 2018 Defence Ministers' Meeting in Brussels, the Joint Support and Enabling Command was established. The NATO headquarters JSEC reached full operational capability in September 2021.



Multinational staff members of the Joint Support and Enabling Command.
(Photo by Gina Seegert, OR-4)

JSEC'S KEYSTONES: EFFECTIVE – EFFICIENT – ENABLEMENT

From the eastern seaboard of North America to the Norwegian fjords and Baltic states in northeastern Europe, from Poland and Romania in eastern Europe to Turkey and Greece in the south, JSEC is helping to enable and coordinate the reinforcement and sustainment of forces in a 360-degree approach. The headquarters contributes to NATO's ability to project and sustain combat power in and throughout the area of responsibility (AOR) of SACEUR.

JSEC works within three major lines of operation, influenced by current developments at the operational and strategic levels, to expedite and smooth the rapid flow of forces and their sustainment across the continent. After developing a plan to enable SACEUR's AOR, JSEC creates a 'toolbox', the Reinforcement and Sustainment Network (RSN). Effective and efficient management is crucial to fulfill JSEC's mission. Effective – Efficient – Enablement are therefore the three main cornerstones of the headquarters' activities.

Cross-border cooperation is indispensable for JSEC. Therefore, it combines and correlates data from all relevant military and civil authorities, governmental and non-governmental institutions of NATO member states and the EU, with which it maintains a close network. The resulting comprehensive enablement database, with information on existing infrastructure and necessary preconditions, such as legal arrangements, is essential for the movement of troops, material and supplies. JSEC also acts as SACEUR's



The members of the Joint Support and Enabling Command during their work in the Joint Operation Centre.
(Photo by Bastian Suepple OR-4)

advisor in the area of reinforcement and sustainment. Therefore, JSEC provides all relevant information in these areas and assists to take the right decisions at the strategic level.

DETECTING AND DEFENDING THREATS TO NATO MEMBER STATES

In response to the current security situation following Russia's invasion of Ukraine, NATO has increased its Response Force (NRF) to up to 300,000 troops. The NRF is a highly ready, technologically advanced multinational force composed of land, air, maritime and special operations components that the Alliance can rapidly deploy wherever needed. In challenging and uncertain security environments such as today's, JSEC coordinates this force build-up, a prerequisite for credible deterrence, and the subsequent sustainment of these operations, the basis for possible effective defence.



JSEC: Army material of the United States of America is being shipped to Europe during the exercise Defender Europe 20, in Bremerhaven, Germany, Feb. 22, 2020. The exercise, which began February 2020, is being held throughout the Area of Responsibility of the Supreme Allied Commander Europe.
(Photo by Carl Schulze, OR-7)



WESTERN BALKANS 2023

CONFLICT MANAGEMENT IN THE GEOPOLITICAL CROSSFIRE

Predrag Jureković

Under pressure from the geopolitical conflict with Russia, the European Union is again pursuing strategic goals in the Western Balkans after a prolonged standstill. The French-German plan for Kosovo and Serbia offers the best opportunity in a long time for the EU to engage in constructive conflict management, but it faces great resistance.

REGIONAL FRAGILITY

The Western Balkans (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Serbia) represent the merely half-consolidated European Union's front yard in terms of securing peace, democratic principles, and the rule of law. Opportunities for regional cooperation and future integration into the EU have so far been seized only in an inadequate manner. Decisive in this are unsolved conflicts dating back to the wars in the 1990ies. Due to the rise of authoritarian currents in individual Western Balkan states and an EU integration policy that was dominated by bureaucracy rather than strategy for quite some time, hardly any progress has

been made in the regional consolidation process since Croatia's accession to the EU in July 2013.

CONFLICTING INTERESTS

The political vacuum in the Western Balkans has been exploited by external actors to strengthen their geopolitical and geo-economic role in South-Eastern Europe. China, Russia and Turkey are particularly engaged in the Balkans, with their activities being partly in competition with the regional engagement of the EU and the USA: In the case of Russia, its Balkan activities clearly contrast with those of the EU and the USA. Examples for this from the more recent past are Russia's involvement, according to Montenegro's Public Prosecutor's Office, in the failed coup d'état of October 2016 prior to Montenegro's accession to NATO, and the strong criticism of the Prespa Agreement of June 2018 voiced by Russia's Foreign Ministry. The agreement was signed under EU mediation and put an end to the long-standing diplomatic conflict between Athens and Skopje.

The political opposition between the Western actors EU and USA, on the one hand, and Russia, on the other, is particu-

larly apparent in the context of the international support of the peace processes in Bosnia and Herzegovina. There, Russia in conjunction with China in vain tried to prevent the German politician Christian Schmidt from being appointed the new High Representative of the United Nations for Bosnia and Herzegovina in the UN Security Council in 2021, and supports separatist politicians from the BiH entity Republika Srpska with political means.

Europe's change of paradigm in security policy brought about by Russia's military aggression against Ukraine has significantly increased the Western Balkans' relevance for the West. The EU and the USA face the challenge of preventing, by means of proactive conflict management, the geopolitical crisis in Europe from aggravating conflicts between pro-Western and pro-Russian actors in the Western Balkans, thereby causing new regional instability.

HOT SPOT NORTH KOSOVO

A plan jointly presented by France and Germany in September 2022 encouraged by the European Union and the US government is to "normalise" the conflict-ridden



©View from MAGLIC to Montenegro
Colonel Helmut FIEDLER - AUT Armed Forces

den relationship between Belgrade and Prishtina/Priština in 2023. The situation in northern Kosovo, which is predominantly inhabited by Serbs and politically controlled by Belgrade, dangerously escalated at the end of last year. Traffic routes were blocked by Serbs with obstacles and, in parallel, additional checkpoints established by Kosovo's special police force ROSU in the north. Moreover, President Aleksandar Vučić again raised the alert status of Serbia's army to the highest level. The escalation was caused by new regulations in Kosovo applying to licence plates, which resulted in local Serbs with-

EU IS STRATEGICALLY PROACTIVELY ENGAGED IN THE WESTERN BALKANS

drawing from the police, law court system and the political institutions as well as in the arrest of a former Serbian officer of the Kosovo police.

The EU and the USA again had to rely on their Special Representatives Miroslav



“Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, North Macedonia, Montenegro, Kosovo, and Serbia have a perspective to accede to the European Union and hence are also called ‘candidate countries’, resp. in the case of Kosovo ‘potential candidate’.”

Lajčák and Gabriel Escobar to pacify the conflict through diplomatic activities. Yet, also in view of the conflict with Russia, both international actors do not appear to be willing any longer to tolerate the perpetuated conflict cycles in the relations between Belgrade and the Kosovo government led by Albin Kurti. The French-German initiative stands a good chance of at least loosening the Gordian knot posed by the Kosovo-Serbian conflict. This assessment is underpinned in particular by the fact that the deal has been supported since December 2022 both by the European Union – including Greece, Romania, Slovakia, Spain and Cyprus, who have not recognised Kosovo as a state so far – and the US government.

FRENCH-GERMAN INITIATIVE REGARDING KOSOVO-SERBIA

The French-German proposal, whose main points were published by the Serbian daily newspaper Danas in January, focusses the



de-facto recognition of the national and territorial integrity of Serbia/Kosovo by the respective counterpart, which does not need to be effected in the form of an explicit formal recognition. Both sides would recognise national symbols, documents and attributes of their respective neighbour. Should the plan be accepted, Serbia would give up its resistance against Kosovo's admittance into international organisations (including the United Nations). Both sides would commit to support one another in the EU integration process and cooperate economically and in other relevant areas. Comprehensive financial aid from the EU is promised in turn for these concessions. The Western plan to normalise the bilateral relations also provides for all previously entered agreements to be implemented. The Kosovo government is in default in particular in this point, since it has not allowed the Community of Serb Municipalities to be founded on Kosovan territory, as agreed in the Brussels Agreement of April 2013.

CHANCES AND OPPOSITION

With the French-German initiative, Western conflict management with regard to Kosovo/Serbia has returned to a policy

oriented towards traditional European autonomy solutions for ethnic and territorial conflicts. Earlier, EU proposals that were launched mostly in 2018/19 and aimed at an exchange of territories and ethnic shifts had sometimes caused in part strong political irritations in the Western Balkans. But this current, fundamentally constructive plan is also expected to meet with considerable resistance. Serbian president Vučić, who until recently categorically refused both the official and the de-facto recognition of Kosovo as a sovereign state, after intensive talks with EU and US representatives at the end of January avows himself to the French-German draft proposal as a basis for putting an end to the conflict. As Vučić said in a parliamentary speech on 2 February, he had been warned by the West that Serbia's rejection of the plan would terminate the country's integration process into the EU and important further Western investments.

For the first time Vučić, who has been accused both by the liberal-democratic and sections of the national-conservative opposition in Serbia of having established

an authoritarian system through his clientelistic Serbian Progressive Party, is facing a strong political headwind. Due to the softening up of his policy vis-à-vis Kosovo, the accusations levelled against him by his political opponents range from constitutional breach to high treason. Moreover, North Kosovo's stance towards the French-German initiative is rather negative. There, the Serbian population refuses to be reintegrated into the Kosovo system. More positive signals regarding the recent plan for Kosovo are received from the Serbian enclaves south of the Ibar River, where approx. 50% of the Serbs in Kosovo live.

But even Western mediators are not automatically supported in the context of the French-German initiative on the side of the Kosovo-Albanians. Prime Minister Kurti has presented himself as an extremely tough negotiator so far. The official recognition of the sovereignty of Kosovo, which is not explicitly demanded from Belgrade by the West, is met with criticism in Prishtina/Priština in the same way as the Western and Serbian demand on the Kosovo government to implement the Serb Community of Municipalities. Many Kosovo-Albanians see this as an attempt by Belgrade to render Kosovo dysfunctional as a state by imitating the Bosnian and Herzegovinian entity Republika Srpska. On the one hand, the USA categorically rules out a Republika Srpska scenario for the Serb Community of Municipalities, which in the Western view is to have only limited autonomy rights and be compatible with the constitution of Kosovo. On the other, the Kosovo government has been clearly signalled by the USA that continued refusal to implement the Community of Municipalities may result in the withdrawal of the political support for Kosovo.

REGIONAL DIMENSION

An improvement of the relations between Belgrade and Prishtina/Priština and Serbia's adoption of a pro-Western course by supporting sanctions against Russia, which has been refused by Belgrade so far, would be highly relevant to the entire region. Such a scenario would probably have a restraining effect on separatist Serbian actors in the BiH entity Republika Srpska. The multi-ethnic and multi-religious state of Bosnia and Herzegovina would then stand a far better chance of using its status as a candidate for accession to the EU, a status that is owed exclusively to the current geopolitical situation, and implement reforms in the area of democracy and the rule of law.

Similarly, the long-standing domestic political conflict in Montenegro, a NATO member and candidate country for EU acces-

sion, also has a strong link to Serbia, in addition to its democracy-political and constitutional dimension. Polarising conflicts of identity between pro-Western/national-Montenegrin actors, on the one hand, and national-Serbian/pro-Putin actors, on the other, massively impede Montenegro's negotiation process with the EU. By abandoning pro-Putin positions and adjusting Serbia's policy towards Russia and China to EU positions, Belgrade might have a de-escalating effect on Montenegro. A new alignment of Belgrade's foreign policy would also lend credibility to regional initiatives launched by Serbia, such as Open Balkan. So far, especially Kosovan and Bosniak politicians have been highly suspicious of such initiatives due to nationalistic and pro-Putin statements emanating from Belgrade.

CONCLUSIONS

- I Under pressure from the geopolitical conflict with Putin's Russia, the EU is strategically proactively engaged in the Western Balkans in cooperation with the USA.
- I The reformation of the EU accession process, which henceforth will allow candidate countries gradually to participate in EU programmes already before their formal accession, is an important step in this direction. The same applies to the candidate status of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the start of negotiations for accession with Albania and North Macedonia.
- I From the perspective of security policy, the NATO membership of Albania, Croatia, Montenegro and North Macedonia acts as a protective shield for this part of South-Eastern Europe in a period of geopolitical change.
- I Negotiations on the French-German plan regarding Kosovo/Serbia could usher in a constructive era for solving existing conflicts in the Western Balkans. Yet, the window of opportunity is exceedingly small in 2023 (uncertain outcome of the war in Ukraine, US presidential election campaign as of autumn 2023, etc.) Western conflict management might also fail because of internal political conflicts in the Western Balkan states concerned.
- I In this situation of regional and geopolitical fragility, military and political safety nets in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo remain absolutely indispensable. This particularly refers to the continuation of the Austrian-backed military peace support operations EUFOR ALTHEA in Bosnia and Herzegovina (overall strength approx. 1,300, with approx. 300 of them being Austrian service personnel) and KFOR in Kosovo (overall strength approx. 3,800, with approx. 300 of them Austrian service personnel).



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Lieutenant General, Polish Army Sławomir Wojciechowski (PhD)

THE POLISH MILITARY IN THE ZEITENWENDE

You fight when necessity arises. No matter the mood.
Frank Herbert, Dune

EUROCORPS' upcoming Change of Command offers an excellent opportunity to reflect on the current state of defense affairs from a Polish standpoint, particularly as a Polish general is set to assume command. I have had the pleasure of meeting Lieutenant General Gromadziński and remember him as a rising Army commander, resolutely set on his path. He is a true achiever, and I warmly congratulate him. Best of luck, Jarosław!

Turning to the matter at hand, the war in Ukraine pervades virtually all military considerations today. The conflict has challenged all assumptions about the prospect of armed conflict in modern Europe. Despite Polish authorities' long-harbored suspicion of Russian intentions, the harsh reality of war has nevertheless shown up unannounced. The scale and intensity of the violence, the vicious destruction, as well as the frequent deliberate targeting of the civilian population and war crimes have been a jarring reminder of the perpetual perils and nature of war. This war is ideologically motivated; it is a nationalistic, rage-fueled

war of attrition. It is said that the more things change, the more they stay the same. In Russia's case, it is the perception and interpretation of immutable facts and phenomena that change, facts that some refuse to accept.

Vantage point matters.

As a NATO and EU frontline country, Poland has been facing unexpected challenges, bearing burdens that it did not ask for and gearing up to play an unavoidable role. Our new reality has

meant accommodating waves of refugees, donating military inventory, and facilitating the smooth delivery of all kinds of assistance by a citizen coalition eager to help Ukrainians in their war struggle.

Simultaneously, NATO has increased its military presence on the Eastern Flank via an intensified air and naval presence above and around Poland, and the EU has launched its first assistance mission within its borders to train Ukrainian soldiers. Alongside our Allies, we are striving to prevent collateral damage and ensure no more civilian war casualties occur on Polish soil. These challenges, burdens, and expectations have spurred Poland to speed up investments in defense.

Decades ago, the Polish military embarked on a transformation motivated by a strategic security shift. Amid competing resource demands and the need to balance NATO expeditionary requirements, territorial defense, and the reassessment of NATO commitments, Poland is now undertaking an unprecedented procurement of modern tanks, long-range artillery, cutting-edge aircraft, and potent cyber capabilities. Frontline garrisons are being reinforced, readiness statuses stepped up, new commands established, and troop numbers bulked out. Such a transformation goes far beyond mere hardware.

Poland is committed to helping develop new models and sharing experiences, including the legal solutions required for establishing the Allied Integrated Air Defense Zones, already implemented in peacetime. Other examples include Lessons Identified in the collective logistic activities of the Rzeszów Logistics Hub, which is regaining and building up military proficiency in large-scale combat service support operations. A multi-domain mindset and operational culture have become our new normal.

Allow me to conclude by echoing once again the words of Frank Herbert, who wrote, **“Those who are great do not seek to lead. They are called to it. And they answer.”**





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Lieutenant General Sławomir WOJCIECHOWSKI, Polish Army
Lieutenant General Jarosław GROMADZIŃSKI, Polish Army



Lieutenant General, Polish Army
Sławomir Wojciechowski (PhD)
Polish MilRep to NATO and EU MC

Education:

Military Academy of Air Defence (1987) National Defence University in Warsaw, Command/Staff Studies at the Faculty of Land Forces, graduated with a diploma (1993-1995). Joint Services Command and Staff College (Shrivenham, Great Britain) - postgraduate studies: Advanced Command and Staff Course (2001). NATO School Oberammergau (Germany), Combined Joint Operations Centre (2002). US Army War College, Carlisle Barracks (Pennsylvania, USA) - post-graduate studies in Defence Politics (2008), Master Degree in Security Studies. US Army War College, Carlisle Barracks - Jointed Force Land Component Commander Course, Centre for Strategic Leadership US Army War College (2017). War Studies University in Warsaw, National Security Department, PhD in Social Science and Security (2017). Generals, Flag Officers & Ambassadors' Course in NATO Defence College Rome (2022)

Military career:

Platoon leader and officer cadet unit leader in the Military Academy of Air Defence (1988-1993); Commander of Anti-Aircraft Artillery Squadron in 3rd Armoured Brigade (1995-1997); Chief of Air Defence in 36th Armoured Brigade and later 36th Mechanised Brigade (1997-1999); Deputy Commander of 4th Zielonogórski Anti-Aircraft Regiment (1999-2004); Commander of 4th Anti-Aircraft Regiment (2004-2007); Chief of Training of 11th Armoured Cavalry Division (2007); Commander of 17th Wielokopolska Mechanised Brigade (2008-2012). Deputy Chief in the Operational Planning Directorate - J3 of the General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces (2012-2013); Director of the Strategy and Defence Planning Department in the Ministry of National Defence (2013-2015); Deputy Operational Commander of the Polish Armed Forces (2015-2016); Operational Commander of the Polish Armed Forces (2017-2018); Commander of the Multinational Corps Northeast in Szczecin (2018-2021); Polish Military Representative to NATO and EU Military Committees (2022-)

Service in operations:

Commander Task Force White Eagle, Polish Military Contingent, Ghazni Province, Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (2011); Commander of EU Battlegroup (2009-2010); Chief of Staff, HQ Multinational Division Central- South, Iraq (2004-2005).

EPIC MOMENTS FROM 2022

The Polish Minister of Defence, Mariusz Blaszczak, stated during the Polish accession ceremony: "The dual nature of EUROCORPS – its availability to both NATO and EU – gives it rather unique characteristics within the NATO Force Structure. Let me say that this feature of EUROCORPS has been one of the main arguments motivating Poland to fully embark on this project and to provide a significant contribution to it."



Exercise Austerlitz 2022: Learning from historical battles to prepare for tomorrow's military challenges. In his role as exercise mentor, Lieutenant-General Peter Devogelaere described Austerlitz 2022 as "a very rich exercise, not only for our French audience for which we are conducting this exercise, but also for EUROCORPS".




On 21 July 2023, EUROCORPS is set to participate in a parade in Brussels celebrating the Belgian National Day.



On 8 and 9 September 2022, EUROCORPS feted its **30th anniversary**. For three decades, the multinational headquarters in Strasbourg has been a showcase for multinationality, unity, professionalism, adaptability and flexible deployability, enhancing Europe's security by deploying forces on behalf of both NATO and the European Union.



"Crawl, walk and run" were the watchwords for **Exercise Common Tenacity 2022**. This exercise gave EUROCORPS personnel the opportunity to train procedures, better get to know one another and work as a team. EUROCORPS is on track for certification as NATO Joint Task Force HQ during the upcoming Exercise Steadfast Jackal 23.





EUROCORPS' Command Post deployed during Exercise Common Tenacity 2022

“Ukrainian Defence Forces have delivered precision strikes on a Russian command post in the village of Chervonyi Maiak in Kherson Oblast, killing 30 Russian service members, destroying two tanks, and four trucks,” reads a report from 12 November 2022 in the online newspaper Ukrain-ska Pravda. “Disperse, dig deep or move fast”¹ is one of the many lessons the military is drawing from Russia’s full-scale war in Ukraine. Dispersion, reliance on speed and the need for hardened shelters or cover are more crucial than ever for the survival of personnel and installations.”

The Command Post (CP) is the location from which command and control is exercised during operations or exercises². The CP’s functional ability to command and control military forces is critical to mission accomplishment.

The CP must therefore be capable of surviving in scenarios triggered by a variety of threats. Survival means being able to resist and continue to operate in all these scenarios. This ability is known as resilience.

According to the Allied Joint Doctrine for Force Protection (AJP 3.14), resilience “consists in measures, tasks, and activities to increase friendly forces’ ability to continue to operate despite adversary action or other hazards.”



Command Post (HQ EC CP) defines resilience as those measures, tasks and activities that allow the commander to command and control units during deployment and follow-on operations despite the threat posed by hostile activities and/or environmental conditions.

Command & Control (C2) structures are increasingly susceptible to adversarial cyber and electromagnetic activities due to their emissions and recognizable signature. Long-range artillery and other fire assets, along with Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) means threaten the survivability of C2 structures, especially those that are large and static³. Therefore, the CP organization decided upon during CRP (Crisis Response Planning) must bear in mind the following three principles: flexibility, mobility, and a small footprint.

The deployment may take several forms, and the CP could be flexibly deployed in an altered sequence depending on

EUROCORPS' APPROACH TO RESILIENCE OF ITS COMMAND POST

the scenario triggered by the threat scenario. Mobility can be gained through modularity (building blocks) and adequate dispersion and size. A small footprint can be achieved by deploying fewer personnel, using buildings of opportunity and CIS (Communication and Information Systems) with a low electromagnetic footprint.

Hence, electronic C2 systems are likely to be targeted and denied to our forces for extended periods as vulnerabilities are discovered. In this context, physical concentration, including traditional large and static C2 structures, may be a high-risk option. Consequently, redundant CIS services should be considered in order to allow the different critical processes and functions to continue in a degraded environment.

When planning resilience measures to reduce risk and mitigate the potential effects of attacks, hazards or natural disasters, both the appropriate organization of the CP and the services/systems needed within the branches and functional areas to conduct and plan operations should be taken into account.



Achieving improvements in resilience through greater resistance, recuperation⁴, and operational continuity relies on the techniques of dispersal, redundancy, counter-surveillance, and physical protection. Scattering or separating troops, equipment, sites, or activities to reduce vulnerability is known as dispersal. The inclusion of additional components or services that are not essential for C2 operations ensures redundancy, should other components or services fail. Counter-surveillance includes all active and passive measures, tasks, and activities to counteract hostile surveillance. This may include camouflage, concealment and deception measures, which use natural or artificial materials on personnel, objects or tactical positions. Physical protection involves shielding oneself from the effects of weapons or hazards by physical means.

As noted above, events such as attacks, hazards or natural disasters can trigger the following threat scenarios, either separately or simultaneously, ushering in potentially disruptive consequences. These include destruction of the CP site by conventional or terrorist attack, fire, natural disaster or civil unrest; CBRN (Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear) contamination of infrastructure and personnel; pandemic; loss of communications or CIS failure; power outages, energy failures due to reduced host nation support or supply failure; and cyber-attack.

The organization and composition of a CP should be tailored to those scenarios likely to arise in order to make its infra-



Daily Situation Awareness Brief during Exercise Common Tenacity 2022

structure resilient. In addition, each branch or functional area should draft internal instructions setting out alternate systems and a list of measures designed to limit or mitigate the impact of these attacks or events. The objective is to maintain operational continuity amid degraded critical services, taking into account the following priorities: staff safety, ensuring that critical functions and processes can continue in a degraded format through alternate services or systems, and lastly, having documented plans and procedures for rapid and effective restoration of FAS (Functional Area Services) for critical functions and processes.

¹ Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies, *Preliminary Lessons in Conventional Warfighting from Russia's Invasion of Ukraine: February–July 2022*

² AAPo6 NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions.

³ Alison Clerici and Frank Kaemper, "Balancing C2 resilience", <https://wvellingroom.com/2021/02/17/balancing-c2-resilience/>

⁴ AJP-3.14 Recuperation covers those measures necessary for the force to recover from the effects of attack, restore essential services, and enable operations to continue, with the minimum of disruption.

Resilience measures should be planned in all branches or functional areas within the CP to provide a defence against a perceived or actual threat, and, if necessary, to find, fix and eliminate threats and hazards before they occur. The effects of enemy attacks, hazards or natural disasters should be minimized to protect forces from operational, tactical and physical consequences. Recovery and restoration of essential capabilities should be done in such a way that operations can resume with minimal disruption in the shortest possible timeframe.

The resilience of the EUROCORPS command post is improved in two different areas. On the one hand, its infrastructure can inexpensively be made more resilient through the proper deployment and organization of the CP, and on the other hand via rigid communications and redundant systems to carry out the different processes in the branches or functional areas when critical services are down.

Technology plays an important role in improving CP resilience. Armies are currently experimenting with mobile mission command platforms, decreasing the size and complexity of installations and developing secure WIFI in place of traditional server stacks, reducing electronic signatures.

Future CPs will have to rely on a high-availability network featuring multiple nodes and communications paths, exploring technology that makes communications, interfaces and decision-making seamless, resilient and fast.

Command Posts, the erected tents with a large physical footprint, are increasingly under threat on the modern battlefield. Nonetheless, we must be ready to conduct operations in a degraded environment. This will only be feasible if we have alternative procedures to carry out our processes and critical functions, and if we are trained and prepared to do so.



EUROCORPS' Command Post deployed during Exercise Common Tenacity 2022



Lieutenant Colonel Jesus SANCHEZ PASCUAL joined EUROCORPS G3-Division on 1 August 2020. During his career, Lt Col Jesus SANCHEZ PASCUAL completed several assignments in Spain in functions such as Air Defence Battery Commander, Staff Officer at the Rapid Deployable Corps Headquarters, and Commander of 11/32 Field Artillery Battalion. His operational experience includes deployments to the Multi-National Force Iraq, to ISAF Afghanistan, and as CIMIC Chief to Indonesia following the tsunami disaster as well as J3 Staff Officer at UNIFIL Headquarters Lebanon and ATF Deputy Commander at EUTM Mali. Lt Col Jesus SANCHEZ PASCUAL graduated from the Joint General Staff Course, holds a bachelor's degree in Political Science and a bachelor's degree in Sociology, both from the Spanish UNED University.



EUROCORPS A SYNERGY MODEL FOR EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENCE APPLICATIONS?

While in Rome in the second half of 2020, I was struck by reports of the damage Italy sustained when the first wave of Covid-19 struck in February and March. Early on, it was nearly impossible to get from other countries the equipment that Italy lacked to keep its people safe.

Across the world, millions of lives were at stake. Fierce competition for medical resources was the order of the day. Unilateral action became prevalent. Some governments banned the export of protective equipment from their territories. It took time and many casualties before regional organisations, primarily the European Union, managed to coordinate and shelter their members from the global scramble for scarce resources.

Whether faced with military aggression or a natural disaster, preparedness constitutes a permanent economic challenge for states. From past conflicts between European powers to more recent efforts to protect against Covid, to the defence of Ukraine, to the disaster relief operations following the earthquakes in Türkiye and Syria, all share a common dilemma: the procurement, financing and maintenance of up-to-date security equipment, though essential, can represent an unsustainable burden on public finances over the long term¹, especially if only executed in a national framework and limited to wartime use.

The first weeks of the crisis laid bare the weaknesses of states and international structures when all their members are subjected to intense pressure. The difficulties faced when dealing with a life-threatening security problem tend to be economic in nature: how do you finance the procurement and maintenance of expen-

sive and non-productive crisis security assets in peacetime? This situation is set to repeat itself for military resources, at a time when too many countries urgently need them.

In peacetime, the global economic and social environment will not always be amenable to prioritising increasingly

¹ This is explained by Paul Kennedy in *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers*, Vintage books.



Kapi hybrid and deployable power plant for isolated sites, copyright Kapi



SILRIA asset-tracking technology gives tactical and strategic visibility to Eurocorps nations, from rear depots to areas of operations, and avoids the duplication of multinational structures.

Integration of national capabilities:

- provides a laboratory for multinational interoperability,
- diversifies national security investments,
- multiplies effects.

Common ownership:

- enables economies of scale,
- contributes to capability development of new technologies,
- provides return on investment for Framework Nations.

Dual technologies and services:

- build on the latest industrial progress,
- benefit from civilian technologies,
- contribute to EU green transition objectives.

costly military security. Traditional multinational cooperation is a solution with two constraints. On the one hand, it is limited by the ability and willingness of partners to truly support one another. On the other hand, it is constrained by the interoperability of equipment and processes.

In a world of uncertainty, pooling resources among a few countries can ease the cost of ownership and increase the utilisation rate. Moreover, developing capabilities in new tech, including dual-use technologies, can also yield returns for contributing member states and promote interoperability. Synergies such as those achieved at EUROCORPS provide a framework for cost sharing and innovation.

While necessary, it is very expensive for any individual state to possess sufficient military equipment, both in quantity and

quality, to face down a potential military conflict or a global security crisis. Despite the current surge in military budgets in Europe, it is not certain that every European state can finance and maintain the most funding-intensive military capabilities in the long term. First, the time when our states could easily finance spending is over, as interest rates are rising. Second, the 2008 financial crisis and Covid-19 crisis have raised public debt to levels that are no longer sustainable. Third, many European countries are struggling with low birth rates, which undermine economic growth. Fourth, inflation is making a comeback, rendering purchases and maintenance costlier, especially for defence customers locked in by single providers in captive markets. Fifth, climate change entails increasing costs for most states², and further degradation of nature could cause addi-

²The economic cost of climate change could be six times higher than previously thought. Study published in *Environmental Research Letters*, quoted by UCL, London's Global University, on 6 September 2021;

³"Future pandemics will emerge more often, spread more rapidly, cause greater damage to the global economy and kill more people than COVID-19", UN-backed report by the Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services in 2020.

PANDEMICS



CLIMATE CHANGE



ECONOMIC SHOCKS



tional pandemics³. Sixth, the risks of political instability resulting from recurring economic crises, and, consequently, the rise of populism jeopardise sound long-term investments. Therefore, it is not a foregone conclusion that states will always keep their military spending at announced levels. A new financial crisis or some other economic setback is likely to require belt-tightening, and it is often more convenient to curtail military spending to save money in the short term. Against this prospect, history teaches that it is unlikely that our states will always be able to fund hefty military capacities. To quote an old French adage *"Point d'argent, point de Suisses"*⁴. At best, we will experience a drawdown of quantity across functional areas, with "single shot" light capabilities. In the worst case, there will be gaps in capacity.

Moreover, it is recognised that the scale of some challenges may be beyond the scope of national capabilities. In a global crisis, people can only rely on what they have themselves, with states unsure they will receive what they have ordered outside national industrial suppliers. Multifold crises can combine a major security problem with a natural disaster, epidemics, disruption of the internet or navigation systems, failure of energy or water distribution, public unrest in Europe or its neighbourhood, and uncontrolled and massive population movements. A crisis that undermines civilian capabilities and the continuity of public services is most likely to require military support and a contribution to the resilience of the European Union or its member states. Russian attacks on Ukraine's energy grids and communications networks show which essential capabilities need to be invested in first. If the supply chain of essential provisions is dependent on third parties, who, while not adversaries, have other important national priorities, autonomous action may fall short. Sharing risk with a limited number of partners by integrating resources into shared assets is a way to ease the cost burden of ownership by a single country. Such a system avoids duplicating exclusively nationally owned resources. It provides a much more reliable means than the messy contingency of requests for support, expensive leasing and unpredictable last-minute purchases. Cooperation with a small number of partners yields concrete results because it is easy to implement.

This is made evident by multinational entities in the domain of military air transport: the European Air Transport Command (EATC), the Multinational Multi-role Transport and Tanker Fleet (MMF), or even the Strategic Airlift International Solution (SALIS) contract. A bilateral maritime integrated approach such as BENESAM⁵ is also a good example of fruitful synergy through logistics sharing. A lean organisation facilitates the sharing of national assets and common investments, with each member being a co-owner and committed stakeholder.

The lack of interoperability remains a barrier to smooth multinational cooperation and national efficiency. There is a huge gap

between rhetoric and reality. Many resources and national processes are not compatible, leading to several challenges. First, duplications arise between European states that could have otherwise supported one another in the same geographic areas. Second, national capabilities suffer from inefficiency, as optimum combinations are not met. Third, the overall military footprint is structurally increased. Fourth, the costs to each individual state are higher, notably due to "lion's share" situations in defence markets, condemning armed forces to procure additional items and services continuously from the same unique providers for each equipment category. Dissuasive switching costs prevent buyers from diversifying their suppliers⁶.

Day-to-day cooperation in peacetime and in concrete operational missions provides a unique framework for identifying gaps and proposing solutions. Obtaining and managing the resources required to support and enable operations and missions in a timely manner is the hidden part of the operational effectiveness iceberg.

This is certainly not a challenge that can be overcome with last-minute force generation. It requires time, technical competence, both in-house and in conjunction with national capability development circles, a long-term vision, and multi-year procurement plans driven by strategic decision-making.

Within Europe, the lack of interoperability remains a barrier to smooth multinational cooperation and national efficiency.

Sharing scarce resources with individual nations can help address weaknesses or capability gaps. EUROCORPS is a joint venture with a limited number of actors who agree not only to share the use of national equipment and manpower, but also to jointly finance new equipment and services. The number of nations allows for economies of scale for expensive equipment and services. The expenditures of each Framework Nation are rounded out and vindicated by the contributions of the other five. This ensures high overall standards. The diversity of national physical contributions allows each capability package to be combined and multiplied according to each countries' capabilities. There is a division of responsibilities for the provision of equipment and services, which can be supplemented by voluntary contributions. Luxembourg, for example, can contribute to strategic airlift. EUROCORPS' limited number of Framework Nations allows for a greater degree of autonomy in the use of resources, especially in times of crisis.

Delegating authority to the Commander of EUROCORPS allows for a lean administrative and procurement process. Operating in this manner allows the nations to retain control while facilitating the autonomous procurement of resources deemed necessary for the years to come. Moreover, it opens the door for

⁴ "No money, no Swiss", common saying when former kingdoms' armies included many mercenaries;

⁵ Belgisch-Nederlandse Samenwerkingsakkoorden;

⁶ Switching cost models are situations whereby buyers find it more expensive to switch from one seller to another. These models have been explained by economists such as Joseph Farrell and Paul Klempner in *Coordination and Lock-In: Competition with Switching Costs and Network Effects. Handbook of Industrial Organization, Vol 3. M. Armstrong and R. Porter (eds.), North-Holland 2007.*



Le Port du Rhin (RET), civilian partner of Eurocorps.
Crédit photo PAS-F. ZVARDON

EUROCORPS to invest in new technologies providing command and support capabilities. This provides opportunities for the development of new assets yet to be procured at the national level. Budget and risk-sharing is a must for the defence ministries of the Framework Nations, as such schemes can be implemented in industrial joint ventures. Instead of slowly renewing old equipment, countries can make more ambitious investments that pave the way for the renewal of their respective national capabilities. This can be achieved through the sharing of technical lessons learned and the co-ownership of next-generation equipment.

EUROCORPS could act as a laboratory for the development of national and multilateral research projects in the domains of information technology, artificial intelligence, smart energy, and shelters, which could be enhanced by the intellectual support of the EU Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) and

EDA Cap Technology groups. Some projects could benefit from European Defence Fund support. Recognising that there are ever fewer barriers between civilian and military technologies, support from civilian EU projects such as the Important Project of Common European Interest (IPCEI) and EU common efforts for energy transition should be explored. This would be facilitated by a unique advantage that EUROCORPS has over other headquarters: the ability to combine operational capabilities with capability development. These functions are usually separate, and combining them requires a lengthy process involving both national and international actors. EUROCORPS could provide agility and a virtuous circle of financial or physical national contributions. When capacity development is recognised by the Framework Nations as one of its distinctive strengths, EUROCORPS can leverage national efforts to develop more command, support and enabling capabilities.



Stakeholders invest in EUROCORPS, in addition to their national or other international commitments, because they do not want to put all their eggs in one basket. It would be a waste of national resources to view EUROCORPS only through tactical lenses and just as another Corps Headquarters. In the short term, EUROCORPS allows for risk diversification through access to resources held only by a limited number of partners. It is an insurance designed to supplement scarce national core capacities in times of crisis. Looking longer term, EUROCORPS provides a unique laboratory for the development of new technologies and interoperability. The pillars for a broader level of ambition could be the following: first, facilitate the purchase and co-ownership of essential dual-use equipment for global crises (satellite communications, power supply, heating, transport and handling, asset tracking, artificial intelligence, water purification, etc.) by EUROCORPS to benefit from economies of scale and prioritise its members' supply chains, to enable national return on investment. Second, optimise the use of EUROCORPS command and control and support capacities for occasional national needs to meet peaks in demand within Europe or beyond. Third, use EUROCORPS to develop its members' new technologies for command and control and dual-use support, if possible with EU support. Fourth, use EUROCORPS as a laboratory for equipment and process interoperability. The success of the EUROCORPS model is based on bridging the gap between operational preparedness and capacity development and on the participating states' genuine understanding that their common military tool has great potential to be a beneficial investment in the near future. More synergies should be created and developed on this model throughout Europe. We have neither money to spare nor time to waste.



Colonel Eric Renaut is currently Branch Head Logistics of HQ EUROCORPS. Over the course of his career, he has held various national and international assignments from tactical to strategic level, serving as Commander of the 503rd transport regiment, Chief of Staff of the French National Surface Transport and Mobility Centre and Resource Support Branch Head of the European Union Military Staff. His operational experience includes deployments to Bosnia-Herzegovina, Democratic Republic of Congo and Chad as Chief Logistic Plans EU FHQ J4, Ivory Coast as Theatre Log Base Operations Chief, Afghanistan as HQ ISAF campaign planner, Italy at HQ Unified Protector, and Mali as Commander of the French Serval Operation Logistic Battalion. He is a graduate of the US Army Logistics Management College, University of La Sorbonne (Master of International Transport), French Joint Defence College, NATO Defence College (Cooperation Course), European Security and Defence College and the French Institut national du service public (Postgraduate course in European studies).

Deployed troops' visual, audible and verbal communication with counterparts down to the lowest tactical level has a significant impact on the informational environment and the overall strategic communication of a given operation. This holds especially true in contemporary conflicts, where perceptions play a crucial role. The rapidly changing nature of information, its flow, processing, dissemination and its impact affects all aspects of Information Operations. Current real-world examples can be found in the various narratives emerging from the ongoing war in Ukraine, designed to reinforce perceptions of Russia through denial and distraction, including refuting Russian war crimes in Ukraine and counter-accusations against Ukrainian forces.

The best way for a force to avoid being seen in a negative light is to behave and act in an upstanding manner. Thus, sustaining a positive presence, posture and profile during an operation, and how local and external audiences perceive this, are key factors in determining whether operational objectives are achieved or, on the contrary, seriously compromised.

It has been posited that "every soldier is a communicator", transmitting a message by his mere presence, with each of his actions being perceived positively or negatively. Presence, Posture and Profile (PPP) is a crucial aspect of the armed forces' role as influencer, and should therefore be considered part of the force's information activities and be monitored and overseen together



with Military Public Affairs, Key Leader Engagement and Psychological Operations. All of these information activities aim to obtain effects that promote the success of the operation. In this case, it is about eliciting the desired behavior from crisis actors, most notably the local population and authorities, in order to win as many "hearts and minds" as possible.

The physical presence of a military force in a particular place or area can have significant effects on perceptions. Deploying even a limited capability in the right time and place can significantly enhance the credibility of messages conveyed through all other channels, making an important contribution to deterrence. In stabilization operations, for example, the presence of

troops can give the local population a sense of creating a safe and secure environment, with the presence of troops affording them direct protection. However, it is clear that troops cannot be everywhere at once. Conversely, their absence may give rise to feelings that the armed forces favor other areas or population groups and that the population has been left to fend off insurgents, rogue elements or criminal groups on its own. Therefore, the decision to deploy troops in one area or city rather than another is important in shaping the local population's perception of the operation.

Troops' posture in the field signals commitment, strength and intent and must be balanced with force protection demands.

European Union Training Mission in the Central African Republic (EUTM RCA) 2021



HOW DOES "PRESENCE, POSTURE AND PROFILE" INFLUENCE AN OPERATION?

EUTM RCA 2022, Bangui



To take a simple example, the decision to wear berets instead of combat helmets and body armor can make a significant difference in the perception of both the adversary and the local population. To be sure, the protection of a force relies on defined protective measures, though an overly aggressive posture is bound to create an atmosphere of tension between the population and the troops, and can generate feelings of mistrust. Therefore, depending on the likelihood of an adversary

interpreting a force's posture (or overall strength) as threatening, the commander must determine a compromise that scales down force protection to an acceptable level.

Finally, units will tend to optimize their profile by bringing to bear any means or effects they can. As the public profile of commanders at all levels is prone to affect perceptions, their visibility should be viewed as an opportunity to convey

key messages. This communication informs how the local population perceives the force and how they interact with deployed troops. This will in turn feed into the unit's reputation among local interlocutors, authorities and the population.

This aspect is particularly relevant within the framework of non-executive missions, as Eurocorps experienced in its recent European Union Training Mission (EUTM) commitments in Mali and the Central African Republic (RCA). Over the course of EUTM RCA, Eurocorps contributed to the Central African Republic's defense sector reform, performing purely advisory tasks in support of the Host Nation. It provided strategic advice to the RCA Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces General Staff, as well as education in non-operational domains including human rights and



EUTM'S expeditionary footprint in Gao, Mali 2021

international humanitarian law. In such operations, the PPP of troops on the ground proved a crucial aspect of the overall operation strategic communication to all counterparts. In a later phase, the activities of the Wagner Group accompanying the same RCA armed forces that had previously been trained by EUTM, in operations across the country led to the perception that the EU was indirectly supporting the Wagner Group, and hereby putting the EUTM's reputation at risk. Ultimately, this led to a temporary and conditions based suspension of the EUTM's activities and EU sanctions against the Wagner Group.

PPP management is facing new challenges. With the rise of new media and global access to information, it is becoming increasingly important for armed forces to consider the role of PPP in shaping their image and perception in the digital realm. Social media, for example, can be a powerful tool for transmitting messages and monitoring public opinion and sentiment. In this context, the Presence, Posture and Profile of troops can be reinforced and disseminated globally, with greater impact and a wider

reach than traditional forms of communication.

Nevertheless, the risk of fake news and disinformation is a major challenge to effective PPP management. For example, rumors of misconduct or human rights violations, even if untrue, can spread quickly and damage the perception of troops and the operation as a whole. In light of this risk, military forces must be prepared to counter fake news and disinformation and proactively shape their own narrative. This requires a comprehensive and integrated approach that combines traditional Information Operations with digital media engagement and strategic communications.

As the information environment continues to evolve, it is critical for armed forces to remain vigilant and proactive in managing their Presence, Posture and Profile in the field as well as in the digital domain. This includes understanding the impact of actions and messages, tracking audiences and adapting their strategies to effectively achieve objectives and support the mission.

PRESENCE

- Physical presence of a military force capability in the right time and place



POSTURE

- Commitment
- Strength
- Intent



PROFILE

- How and why we act and react; interact
- Behaviour



Lieutenant-Colonel Edouard THWAITES graduated from Saint-Cyr Military Academy in 1988. Following several regimental assignments as a junior officer, he completed in 2004 higher military education, specializing in International Relations. In particular, he served as an OSCE Observer in Georgia (South Ossetia and Abkhazia) and later in the French Forces Arms Control Unit, participating in several missions in the former Soviet Republics. In this domain, he also served from 2004 to 2006 as head of the International Relations education department at Saint-Cyr Coëtquidan Military Academy. He has been assigned twice to EUROCORPS, in G2 (Intelligence) from 2006 to 2009, then again in 2015 in the newly created Assessment and Influence Branch. Currently, he is more specifically involved in the HQ's Strategic Communications issues in connection with EUROCORPS' upcoming commitments.



Figure 1 The XQ-58 "Valkyrie" is a low-cost, attritable, stealth UCAV designed for the future

The provision of **Close Air Support (CAS)** remains a crucial part of joint force operations as peer adversary capabilities evolve and become increasingly lethal. The era of uncontested operating environments is now being replaced by a new paradigm of contested environments defended by adversary Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) capabilities.

Before initiating CAS operations, decision-makers must weigh the effects of different airframe capabilities against critical and sensitive ground targets. In high-threat conflicts, due to the survivability issue, being only able to employ scarce 5th generation multi-role platforms in the CAS role is a difficulty.

Recent conflicts, such as the Nagorno-Karabakh war in 2020 and the ongoing war in Ukraine, have confirmed the ability of Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) to deliver precise effects in space and time. This article aims to describe the manners in which UAS can support CAS missions and raises the question of whether they could be the platform of choice for future CAS operations.

UAS are already playing a critical role on the battlefield, providing distinct capabilities including Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) and precision targeting during combat operations. UAS can loiter over suspected or known adversary strongholds for extended periods, mostly in uncontested environments, in order to locate, monitor and, where necessary, engage targets of opportunity. As more advanced features such as the ability to carry guided air



Figure 2 STM Kargu loitering munition

Electronic Warfare (EW) packages are incorporated into UAS, these systems are being touted as the future of air combat vehicles. Such capabilities make UAS prime candidates for use in CAS roles.

Some degree of control over the airspace above the battlefield is a prerequisite for CAS sorties in support of friendly ground troops. UAS were not traditionally intended to operate in highly contested airspace, where even local access is impractical. However, in a situation where sending manned aircraft into contested airspace would pose a significantly higher risk, UAS can provide an alternative. UAS still face the threat of enemy defenses, but because of their extended loiter time, they can stay closer to the target area, allowing for a faster response with zero risk to aircrews.

Additionally, modern UAS with improved stealth, enhanced countermeasure capabilities, and the ability to have buddy drones or small UAS perform Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses (SEAD) are extremely valuable in the modern-day battlespace.

Another way to provide the airspace access necessary for CAS is through the use of swarm UAS. These are relatively cheap, expendable, and designed to operate in large numbers, forming a swarm to overwhelm enemy defenses and achieve the desired military effect. Swarm UAS may well become the system of choice for the most dangerous tasks.

POTENTIAL GAME CHANGER FOR CLOSE AIR SUPPORT

CAS Command and Control (C2) requires a safe, interoperable communications system between aircrews, air control and fire support agencies, Joint Terminal Attack Controllers, and ground forces. A new generation of SATCOM features facilitates UAS's potential role as a communications hub in the C2 network and reduces the likelihood of effective jamming or interference. UAS with radio relay capabilities can play a life-saving role, especially in contested environments. A number of UAS upgrade programs are underway to enhance their communication capabilities in contested or remote environments.

The responsiveness of Air Power is crucial for ensuring ground forces' survivability. More specifically, timely target acquisition is fundamental to delivering effective and responsive



Figure 3 The MQ-9 "Reaper" provides dominant, persistent attack and reconnaissance



CAS. UAS sensor capabilities are an essential part of target acquisition, as they pinpoint enemy locations and distinguish potential targets from friendly troops and civilians. Longer loiter times over areas of interest with enhanced target acquisition capabilities make UAS more valuable during operations by enabling quick targeting decisions. This eases delegation to the lowest possible level within the engagement authority by providing timely and accurate intelligence data.

Defined as “The capability of a system to avoid or withstand hostile environments,” Combat Survivability is the most significant parameter to consider when deciding whether a UAS role in CAS is sustainable. Although new UAS weapons and communications technologies bring enabling capabilities to the battlefield, UAS still have considerable limitations, such as the lack of stealth, reduced speed or maneuverability, as well as weapon load limitations. Any UAS that heads into defended adver-

sary airspace needs to be able to counter integrated surface-based AD systems, EW, combat aircraft, and Man-Portable Air Defense Systems. The ability to cope with these threats will determine the attrition rate of UAS in such an environment. Enhancing the combat survivability of UAS is required to make them fit for purpose in a CAS scenario.

Future UAS will need reduced radar cross-sections, threat detection and



Figure 4 The Bayraktar TB2 has been successfully engaged in recent conflicts

avoidance, damage tolerance, improved autonomous functionality, and redundant navigation system capabilities to survive in a contested environment. The combat survivability of a particular UAS will weigh heavily on the commander's decision on whether to integrate it into operations. A balance must always be sought between combat survivability, mission performance, and reliability.

UAS technology is rapidly maturing to become the multi-role superstar of future combat operations. By leveraging their endurance and amassed firepower, UAS technology can provide timely and responsive CAS for operations. Planning is critical to integrating UAS into CAS operations and requires a thorough understanding of the specific capabilities and vulnerabilities of UAS in order to formulate sound tactical recommendations.

UAS are aptly suited for ISR and the attack of dynamic targets, and they can be critical to winning the battle by incorporating proven operational tactics and combat support planning. UAS need enhanced survival systems when missions require them to operate in contested areas. However, they lack the enhanced survivability equipment of manned aircraft as well as the speed and maneuverability of manned aircraft, which shall remain crucial vulnerabilities inside contested environments until such time as new cutting-edge, stealth-capable and more maneuverable Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles are introduced into the battlespace. A "one-size-fits-all" solution will not always be available, and decision-makers should give due consideration to the roles assigned to UAS during operations, lest they be shot down in high-threat areas. Digesting lessons learned from past air campaigns in geopolitically sensitive and risk areas will be crucial to improving UAS survivability in future conflicts.



Lieutenant Colonel Osman Aksu, TU AF, deserves all credit for publishing this topic "Potential Game Changer for Close Air Support - Enhancing UAS Role in Contested Environments" in the informative and stimulating journal of the Joint Air Power Competence Centre, Ed. 33, in February 2022 https://www.japcc.org/wp-content/uploads/JAPCC_J33_screen.pdf. As the subject is very contemporary, JAPCC granted AREC the permission for republication of parts of the original article.



"AREC" is the nucleus of the Air Operation Coordination Centre (AOCC) of EUROCORPS and is short for "Air Representation to EUROCORPS". The AREC team at Strasbourg comprises **Major Stéphane Charlier**, BE AF, and **Warrant Officer Benoît Sindic**, BE AF.

"I don't know for how long we are going to be lucky in avoiding a nuclear accident" said Rafael Grossi, Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency in late January 2023, after the Russians had illegally occupied the Zaporizhzhia nuclear complex in Ukraine. Kate Brown, author of "Plutopia", uttered the following quote in an interview: "Russians hold Chernobyl and the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power reactor plants, and they are stockpiling weapons and stationing soldiers there as safe havens. This is a new military tactic we have not seen before, where you use the vulnerability of these installations as a defensive tactic". We are living out an all-new scenario in which the likelihood of a catastrophe is self-evident. Protecting populations and military forces against Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) threats posed by CBRN warfare, including terrorism, is one of the three key pillars of military CBRN defence. The second is preventing and coun-

The newly procured CBRN COLPRO system will provide protection against a wide range of CBRN hazards caused by the use of CBRN weapons and devices or the release of toxic industrial materials to mission-critical elements of the headquarters' command and control assets during European Union and NATO-led missions.

The procurement process for the CBRN COLPRO system was divided into three phases. The first components were delivered in April 2023. CBRN specialists and additional personnel from the Headquarters Staff and the Multinational Combat Support Brigade are undergoing continuous training in handling CBRN COLPRO in order to achieve Initial Operational Capability by the end of 2023. The second procurement phase is expected to be complete by February 2024. When the third package of CBRN COLPRO is delivered to EUROCORPS in



Fig. 1 Overview COLPRO/DECONTAMINATION tent system

Collective PROTECTION^{IN A} CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL AND NUCLEAR ENVIRONMENT - New on the horizon

teracting the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction through various actors, and the third is the implementing of appropriate recovery efforts in the event of a CBRN incident, in particular to support civil society in consequence management operations.

In order to conduct military operations across the entire operational and intensity spectrum and maintain all capabilities, it is essential to ensure survivability in Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) environments. Consequently, EUROCORPS is upgrading its current command post module with a CBRN Collective Protection system (COLPRO) designed to enhance command post resilience (Fig. 1).

2025, the CBRN COLPRO system will reach Full Operational Capability.

WHY COLPRO? This unique, state-of-the-art and fully mobile CBRN COLPRO system significantly enhances command and control capabilities during operations, ensuring continuity of operations by allowing personnel to work in a contamination-free environment for more than 24 hours.

What makes this system distinctive is that the high-tech overpressure, filtration, control and outlet components of the CBRN COLPRO system allow personnel to avoid direct contamination without having to constantly wear Individual Pro-

Static demonstration at HQ EUROCORPS





Fig. 2 Exterior overview of COLPRO equipment

tection Equipment (IPE) such as gas masks and CBRN suits. The system also mitigates the adverse physical effects associated with the use of IPE, such as overheating.


Highly efficient air filtration units (minimum 17 m³/h of filtered air per person) combined with CBRN filters and gas-tight cabins called “Toxic-Free Areas (TFA)” create positive pressure within the compartments, blocking the entry of contaminated air from the outside environment (see Fig. 3).

To maintain the operational effectiveness of CBRN COLPRO shelters and meet their occupants' basic needs, indoor toilets and hand-washing sinks have been installed. The entire CBRN system is maintained at a controlled temperature via state-of-the-art CBRN heating, ventilation and air conditioning units. The CBRN COLPRO elements can withstand temperatures from -32°C to +49°C (see Fig. 3).

If contaminated personnel and equipment need to be treated before entering designated CP Toxic Free Areas (TFAs), the Contamination Control Area is set up with a three-step decontamination shower system. Soldiers pass through a decontamination line and are directed to their workstations. The decontamination unit, comprising an integrated undressing and dressing area, has capacity to decontaminate 10 persons per hour.

The range of CBRN warfare methods is expanding. When adversaries and terrorists are unable to fight directly, they use chemical nerve agents such as sarin and Novichok, biological agents such as anthrax, or widely available toxic industrial materials such as chlorine.

In summary, the CBRN COLPRO system and the proper application of protective measures in the event of CBRN hazards will significantly contribute to the safety of personnel during future operations.






Fig. 3 Interior view of a COLPRO system in use – TFAs, Airlocks and toilets



Lieutenant Colonel Mariusz Tyburski specializes in CBRN defense. Currently assigned as Chief of HQ EUROCORPS' CBRN Defense Section, LTC Tyburski graduated from the Military Technical University of Warsaw, where he acquired expertise in CBRN topics. He gained extensive experience in various military CBRN units of the Polish Armed Forces, including the 5th Chemical Regiment and the CBRN Area Control Centre. There he served in various positions, including the post of Commander of the Biological Deployable Laboratory. Prior to joining HQ EUROCORPS, he was responsible for CBRN defense plans, activities and procedures within headquarters and units at the CBRN Defense Directorate of the Polish Armed Forces General Command. Currently, LTC Tyburski's main task is to enhance the CBRN defense capabilities of HQ EUROCORPS and its subordinate units, with a view to performing tasks during potential upcoming European Union and NATO-led operations.



Conference at HQ EUROCORPS, 12 Dec 2022

A conference entitled
«Addressing legal challenges in the operational context of current conflicts»
 was held on 12 December 2022 under the auspices of EUROCORPS and the Fondation
 René Cassin - International Institute for Human Rights in Strasbourg.

Some 150 guests accepted the invitation to attend the conference at EUROCORPS Headquarters. The plenary session featured senior and top officials from the commands and legal departments of several other NATO headquarters and defence ministries, as well as a number of university professors and active and former judges of the European Court of Human Rights.

Lieutenant General Devogelaere, Commander of EUROCORPS, opened the conference by stressing the importance of law in the planning and conduct of operations, if only to ensure the legitimacy of military actions and the legal security of soldiers. Regarding the situation in Ukraine, he emphasised the importance of the "rule of law" as a countermodel to arbitrary rule, barbarism and oppression.

The director of the Fondation René Cassin, Professor Sébastien Touzé, thanked EUROCORPS for the opportunity to preside over an overarching exchange of ideas and hear different perspectives on today's intricate legal situation during question-and-answer sessions.

December 12th, 2022

In addition to the ongoing war in Ukraine, the speakers focused on Europe's southern flank, particularly the Sahel region of Africa. High-ranking military speakers shared the concern that after a foreseeable withdrawal of European forces, the "vacuum" created risks being filled by actors with no regard for the law. Former commanders of various military missions also stressed that, in an operational framework, the law is never a burden, but rather the best means to achieve proportionate use of military power.

Across three sessions, speakers gave valuable insights into fascinating topics from their areas of expertise.

The conference covered a wide range of compelling topics: The fight against terrorism, explaining "lawfare" as a tool for modern conflict management, and compliance with international humanitarian law and human rights in current conflicts. Over the course of the conference, it became clear that the complex

ADDRESSING LEGAL CHALLENGES IN THE OPERATIONAL FRAMEWORK OF PRESENT-DAY CONFLICTS

and simultaneously occurring international and non-international armed conflicts pose many challenges on a legal level. The practical implementation of legal requirements, especially in military missions, was scrutinised and discussed. All of these challenges require adequate responses, making the task of commanders and legal advisers all the more difficult.

The most controversial topic at the conference was the new concept of legal operations. Experts refer to the use of law as an operational tool using the catchword "lawfare" or "legal operations". Lawfare is a portmanteau composed of the words "law" and "warfare". What exactly is meant by "lawfare" has not been definitively clarified and is the subject of much debate.

As a basis for common understanding, this article defines lawfare as follows: "Lawfare is the use of law as an instrument of





power. In this context, both legal institutions and legal remedies as a whole can be used in all legal systems with the aim of harming the opponent or gaining any manner of advantages. Harm to the opponent should be defined very broadly, given the wide range of possible applications. Delegitimising the other party, as well as preventing the assertion of legal claims, may also constitute a harmful act. In addition, advantage can also be gained in a dispute by using lawfare to cast one's own participation in the conflict in a positive light with regard to the public interest. In principle, lawfare can be used in any situation. It can be used alone or in combination with conventional military or hybrid instruments of power.

Conference participants critically questioned whether the use of lawfare can decisively influence the outcome of a military conflict at all, or whether the concept is bound to fail when met with real-world obstacles.

After long discussions, participants concluded that conflicts are increasingly being waged at all levels and in all dimensions...

Legal action taken against Russia by the United Nations, the EU or even Ukraine demonstrated for some participants the limits of the concept of lawfare. Russia launched its war of aggression against Ukraine on 24 February 2022 despite the knowledge that NATO and EU member states would impose far-reaching legal and economic sanctions, resulting in its total political isolation.

Furthermore, some participants argued that court decisions are not enforced, or only after time-consuming litigation, such that there is no concrete operational benefit. The "law of the strong" is therefore thought to stand in the way of the rule of law and limit the successful use of lawfare.

Other participants argued that the prospect of economic isolation, sanctions (e.g. the freezing of individual accounts and assets), punitive tariffs and boycotts could deter third parties from joining an ongoing conflict. To that extent, operational legal measures could at least help prevent an armed conflict from escalating.

After much discussion, participants concluded that conflicts are increasingly being waged at all levels and in all dimensions. This is where the idea of lawfare comes in, with its understanding of law as an instrument of power. Law can be used in various ways as a complementary factor in conflict management. It should be noted, however, that legal action generally has a greater chance of success against states or organisations with little power of their own. Only in such scenarios can lawfare be decisive to the outcome of an (armed) conflict.



Closing remarks by Lieutenant General Peter Devogelaere

Thanks to the speakers' wide-ranging expertise, the discussion panels were able to address fine legal points in considerable detail. The event was coupled with a well-coordinated programme of side events, which made for smooth proceedings and spirited discussions.

The high quality of the conference and its guest speakers was explicitly praised by speakers and participants alike, as the great working atmosphere and in-

ternationally-minded content proved conducive to lively and constructive discussions.

In his closing remarks, Lieutenant General Devogelaere reiterated that compliance with humanitarian law, human rights and other legal requirements make all the difference during military operations. Law, he said, acts as the guardian of our free liberal democracies. As long as there

are armed conflicts, the law remains necessary because it serves higher interests and ultimately promotes peace, the common aspiration of all humanity. Such discussions must continue, he said.

EUROCORPS therefore hopes to organise another successful legal conference in the future with a view to fostering regular interdisciplinary and international exchange.



Regierungsdirektor and Lieutenant Colonel (reserve) Dominik Gerhold has been a legal advisor with the German Federal Armed Forces, the Bundeswehr, since 2008. His service includes roles within the Franco-German Brigade, as a legal instructor at the German Army Officers' School, with the German National Military Representative to SHAPE, as an exchange officer with the Legal Department of the French Ministry of Armed Forces in Paris. Additionally, he worked as a legal advisor with the International Law Division of the German Federal Ministry of Defence in Berlin before joining EUROCORPS as Chief Legal Officer in the summer of 2021. LTC Gerhold has also served multiple times as a legal advisor abroad in countries such as Afghanistan, Mali, Burkina Faso, and Lithuania.

MULTINATIONALISM -BENEFITS AND CHALLENGES-

Multinationalism refers to the idea or practice of cooperation and collaboration between multiple nations or nationalities, often in the context of international organisations or alliances. It can be understood to include the recognition and promotion of shared interests and values among different countries, as well as the negotiation of agreements and treaties to address common challenges and pursue common goals.

In the modern era, multinationalism gained prominence with the League of Nations as the first major step towards a more multilateral approach to international relations. Despite its failure to prevent the outbreak of World War II, cooperation between countries took on even greater importance in the post-war era. The United Nations was established with a mandate to promote peace, security, and cooperation among nations. In addition to the UN, a wide range of other international organisations has striven to promote multinationalism in various aspects of international relations.

By pursuing a multinational approach, such organisations have sought to encourage countries to work together and facilitate dialogue and cooperation on issues such as security, trade and human rights. Multinationalism emphasizes the importance for nations to share information, coordinate efforts and pool resources in order to develop joint strategies, effectively address global challenges and ensure the security of their citizens.

Multinationalism is the foundation upon which NATO and the EU are based and the idea that underpins many other organisations, entities and associations. For some time, it has been promoted as the most efficient, and perhaps even the only path to prosperous development. This article aims to provide a brief overview of what multinationalism is, how it manifests itself at EUROCORPS, and the benefits and challenges that the concept entails.

In the military and defence areas, multinational cooperation is firmly established within NATO and, to a lesser extent, within the European Union (EU) as well. EUROCORPS, with its multinational headquarters based in the European Capital of Strasbourg, is a one-of-a-kind institution for both NATO and the EU. It stands as a shining example of multinational cooperation between its six Framework and five Associated Nations. Embodying a spirit of multinationalism, EUROCORPS was founded more than 30 years ago with the idea of defining, training and retaining core capabilities for any kind of operational commitment not only on the national level, but to recognise them as a multinational, European aim.

Beyond these rather abstract considerations, multinationalism takes on a very personal dimension for anyone working in such an organisation and living in a multinational community. EUROCORPS personnel are offered the possibility to interact and learn from people from different countries and backgrounds. Greater understanding of different cultures and ways of life helps one to break down barriers and promote greater social cohesion and understanding. From the outset, one of the aims for EUROCORPS was to "shape soldiers with various cultural and historical backgrounds," to quote EUROCORPS' first commander, Lieutenant

EUROCORPS counts 11 member nations

Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg, Poland and Spain are Framework Nations. Austria, Greece, Italy, Romania and Türkiye are Associated Nations.

EUROCORPS is a unique,

professional, and military command and control tool available and ready for both the EU and NATO.

EUROCORPS is prepared to command assigned forces,

as decided by the Framework Nations, for the benefit of NATO, the EU or other international organizations



The main building of EUROCORPS in Strasbourg, France

General Helmut Willmann. Having put this concept into practice for 30 years now, EUROCORPS has not only shaped and moulded the soldiers at its headquarters; we now see that the diversity of its personnel, hailing from 11 different nations, with different backgrounds, values and insights, has in turn shaped EUROCORPS. This diversity makes it possible to find comprehensive solutions for complex issues and encourages service members to put aside individual interests, to pursue goals that transcend national purviews and grow together as a multinational team of teams.

Overall, the concept of multinationalism can

provide a range of benefits across different contexts, and EUROCORPS and its personnel benefit from well-established multinational cooperation. Yet the concept

of course has its limitations and challenges. In recent years, we have seen the rise of nationalism and populist movements, which prioritize the interests of one's own country over those of the international community. This can lead to a weakening of international institutions and cooperation. Although certainly not uniformly applicable, this development could be caused by a scepticism towards multinationalism rooted in challenges such as diverging interests,

EUROCORPS, WITH ITS MULTINATIONAL HEADQUARTERS BASED IN THE EUROPEAN CAPITAL OF STRASBOURG, IS A ONE-OF-A-KIND INSTITUTION FOR BOTH NATO AND THE EU.

rules and regulations that govern multinational organisations ever more complex. In addition, unequal power dynamics and misunderstandings brought on by dissim-

priorities and different issues or different legal and political systems. This can in turn render the



ilar cultural and linguistic backgrounds can hamper multinational cooperation. To avoid tension and mistrust, we must respect one another's cultures and remain open to all possible solutions. At EUROCORPS, these principles that are reflected in a permanently diverse staff composition and an ongoing, active pursuit of cohesion and mutual trust among its members. It so happens that the expert groups and committees at which representatives of EUROCORPS and the Framework Nations discuss policy orientations can only decide by unanimous agreement. Though liable to protract negotiations and decision-making, it is necessary to merge all national interests into a multinational goal.

All in all, the challenges inherent to multinationalism are significant and complex.

They require ongoing dialogue, collaboration, and negotiation among different countries and groups to build trust, overcome differences, and identify common ground and shared goals.

Nevertheless, multinationalism is likely to continue to play an important role moving into the future, not only in the security and defence fields, but throughout international relations in general. International organisations will continue to provide platforms for dialogue and cooperation among nations. In the face of global challenges such as climate change, economic inequality, and the COVID-19 pandemic, cooperation and collaboration beyond the national level will be crucial, as such problems require multinational solutions.

Still, multinationalism is not an automat-

ic recipe for success. NATO and EU member states have much in common with respect to their political systems, economies, societies and interests, and that is why they are rightly looked upon as the world's most successful multinational organisations. Reaching an agreement and carving out solutions can nonetheless at times prove a tremendous undertaking, and the relations between partners are not without conflict. However, EUROCORPS' 30-year existence is a prime illustration that with a sustained effort and a strong belief in one's cause, multinational cooperation will succeed. Not only has the idea of multinationalism been successfully promoted within EUROCORPS, the concept has proven itself as a valuable asset for NATO and the EU in a host of challenging situations and spanning multiple commitments.

Soldiers from the Multinational Command Support Brigade



Captain Micha Messerschmidt was born in Stuttgart, Germany, in 1992. He joined the army in 2011. As part of his officer training, he studied Political and Social Sciences with a focus on International Law and Politics. After graduating with a master's degree from the University of the Bundeswehr Munich in 2016, he completed his infantry officer training in 2017. Afterwards, he was posted to the German-French Brigade, where he served as Platoon Leader and Deputy Company Commander. Since 2022, he has been part of Eurocorps G1 (Human Resources).



Soldiers during Exercise Common Tenacity 2022




The Command Senior Enlisted Leader of EUROCORPS and his Finnish Colleague (2nd and 3rd from left)

On 3 February and 10 March, respectively, EUROCORPS Headquarters was honored with the visit to Strasbourg of two high-level Swedish Armed Forces and Army Command Senior Enlisted Leaders (CSEL) and the Sergeant Major of the Finnish Army. The purpose of our guests' visit was to deliver a presentation on their national Non-Commissioned Officer (NCO) Corps and the challenges that Sweden and Finland will face in the context of their future accession to NATO. The presentation was part of EUROCORPS' Additional Professional Education Programme (APEP).

expertise and military capabilities. "Finland is using all of the countries' available resources to defend its homeland, and their will to defend Finland by armed force in any situation is strong," said the Sergeant Major of the Finnish Army. As EUROCORPS continuously trains to assume its role in NATO missions, the visit was a fantastic opportunity to gain insight into the human resources organisation of these two armies. Given the Alliance spans a vast geographical area and comprises more than 30 nations, getting to know more about one's partners is always beneficial. The current state of affairs of our guest countries' posture towards NATO membership provided an opportunity to learn more.

SWEDISH AND FINNISH SENIOR NCOs VISIT EUROCORPS



These visits were possible thanks to an extensive network of contacts in the multinational NCO community built up over the years and to the work and support of EUROCORPS' CSEL Working Group¹. I am convinced that such high-level visits have a great impact as part of the broader educational programme that EUROCORPS promotes for its staff. They are relevant indeed, as our Headquarters is training in 2023 to assume the role of Joint Headquarters for NATO in 2024 (JHQ24). Moreover, these two presentations provide us with food for thought, because these nations have worked or are working with highly specific systems. Their visit was ultimately another step in the NCO empowerment process being pursued at EUROCORPS.

Russian aggression against Ukraine is not only a catastrophe for its citizens, but a wake-up call that has caused most countries to reconsider their security posture towards Russia. Sweden and Finland, which did not intend to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), have changed their minds, simultaneously handing over their official letters of application after thorough debates within their societies. Their bids to join NATO will enhance the Alliance's security, with each country bringing significant

EUROCORPS personnel who were deployed to the European Union Training Missions in Mali and the Central African Republic in 2021 and 2022 had the opportunity to work alongside Swedish and Finnish counterparts. Our guests delivered their presentation to a large and wide-ranging audience from our Headquarters. One of the most remarkable topics discussed was the offer made a few years ago to Swedish officers to continue their careers as non-commissioned officers. The attendees were rather perplexed, as such a career advancement scheme is unheard of elsewhere.

NCOs are expected to maintain discipline and take initiative within the scope of their commander's intent to accomplish the mission. Creative thinking, adopting an alternative perspective, building on one another's strengths and using new technologies are key to leading one's teams and supporting one's command. Of course, the objective is not to come up with wild ideas, but rather to force oneself to think differently and approach problems in novel and innovative ways.

The ability to provide sound advice and support is part of

a bigger picture that allows NCOs to strengthen their position at Headquarters EUROCORPS. Overall, empowering NCOs is critical to the success of military organizations. By giving NCOs the training, education, resources, confidence and recognition they need and deserve, they can successfully accomplish their missions. This is what EUROCORPS is doing through the Additional Professional Education Programme, courses dispensed by the Swiss Armed Forces and NATO training facilities in Oberammergau (Germany) and Oeiras (Portugal), and twice-yearly commendation awards to meritorious personnel. Our organisations must enable managers and leaders at the NCO level to apply adaptive

practices to counter enemy threats, solve problems and accomplish missions based on commanders' intent.

For an example of the importance of a strong and well-functioning NCO corps, look no further than the problems facing the Russian army in Ukraine. The Russian army lacks NCOs, and the few that do exist have failed to shoulder the same responsibilities as their Western counterparts. To quote the wise words of Napoleon: "Never interrupt your enemy when he is making a mistake".

Investing in your NCOs is a sound strategy that not only benefits the individual, but also has positive effects on the organisation as a whole. By providing

opportunities for training and education, you give your NCOs the knowledge and skills they need to perform their duties effectively and efficiently. The aim is to give them a sense of direction and purpose, to achieve higher productivity and better performance levels, and to provide for greater job satisfaction and higher morale. It will also help keep talented NCOs within the organisation, as they have a clear understanding of the opportunities available to them and the steps they need to take to advance.

Providing opportunities to your personnel and empowering them is crucial to the success of military organisations. As CWO (CAN A) Dan Moyer², former

NATO Allied Land Command CSEL, said, "You're in a hierarchical organisation, ... everyone with a lower rank than you is looking to you for leadership, and everyone with a higher rank is expecting you to provide it." The NCO Corps is the backbone of NATO and of our respective armies. This statement should not be used as a mantra without meaning. Our daily task is to give it substance.

Fortified by what we read or see daily about battles in Ukraine, I remain convinced that investing in our NCOs will give us a decisive advantage in terms of freedom and speed of action within the mission command framework for future operations.

¹ The EUROCORPS CSEL Working Group is composed of the Command Senior Non-Commissioned Officer of each EUROCORPS Framework Nation (Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg, Poland, and Spain).

² CWO Dan Moyer, Command Senior Enlisted Leader Allied Land Command, ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE NON-COMMISSIONED OFFICER TACTICAL TO STRATEGIC, <https://shape.nato.int/command-senior/blog>



Senior NCOs from all six EUROCORPS Framework Nations hosted their Swedish counterparts.



Command Sergeant Major Daniel LEGRAND (FRA-Army), born in 1972, entered military service in April 1994. During his career, he served successively at the National Service Office in Rennes, the International Relations Office of the Army General Staff in Paris, the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (Belgium), and the General Staff of the French Army and at the French Embassy in Buenos Aires (Argentina) as assistant Defence Attaché.

Since 2015, CSM Daniel LEGRAND has been stationed at EUROCORPS in Strasbourg. In 2016 and 2021, he was deployed to the Central African Republic under EUTM-RCA. He was appointed EUROCORPS' Command Senior Enlisted Leader (CSEL) on 5 September 2019, graduated from the CSEL course at the Baltic Defence College in Tartu, Estonia, in 2020 and was inducted into that college's Hall of Fame in 2022.

Modern decision-making processes are often complex, requiring organizations to invest significant effort and resources and have a broad vision of the future.

In the case of military organizations like EUROCORPS (EC), it is paramount that organizations possess a clear approach concerning the use of information as a critical resource. While businesses that do not adapt quickly enough to changing environments go bankrupt, military organizations also need to adapt to changing environments. Modern, advanced armies as users of new information technologies must move towards embracing Information and Knowledge Management (IKM) based on scientific and organizational pillars, and, in a context of “intelligence” production, towards Knowledge Development (KD). Why? Because data has become a strategic resource, and the amount of available data had exceeded human capacities to collect, to analyze and to redistribute it. Therefore, the use of new technologies has become critically important.

In order to better support the decision-making process, additional human interaction is essential. Members of personnel involved in the management process must understand the context of the information that they are handling in order to manage it effectively. Their prepa-

identification, collection, and filtering, fusing, processing, disseminating, and the use of information. Information Management Officers assemble information such that it promotes an understanding of the information environment, enables Commands to better formulate and analyze courses of actions, make decisions, execute those decisions, and understand the results of previous decisions.

One of EC’s major challenges is to continuously improve its personnel’s skills in using IKM. To achieve this, EC must cover two integrated and coordinated action areas. Firstly, it needs to define and implement appropriate education, preparation and training programs for personnel. Secondly, it must draft the appropriate IKM plans and acquire technological tools, mainly software, that facilitate their use in the main processes at EC. Likewise, the diverse collective experience pooled among EC staff, who come from NATO countries and often have extensive knowledge of multinational work environments, should be leveraged. Currently, the main challenge is to integrate state-of-the-art Communication and Information Systems (CIS) capable of dealing with the linear information flow in order to support the operational Commander’s command and control.

Information is a critical resource with a specific life cycle that follows a cyclical approach, in contrast to the

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AT EUROCORPS

ration and knowledge of both their work environment, and well as the various tools available to maximize their professional development, are the essential elements which EC is building into its IKM to support the Commander of EUROCORPS’ (COMEC) decision-making process and achieve Information Superiority. Information Superiority refers to a relative advantage in terms of the information at one’s disposal. It enables the provision of the right information to the right people at the right time while reducing the same possibilities to opponents.

How does Information Management (IM) enable the decision-making process at the operational level?

Commands make decisions based on their understanding of the operational environment. The role of IM is to provide a timely flow of relevant information that supports all aspects of planning, decision-making, and execution. IM processes include all activities involved in


linear approach of information processing via CIS, what with its numerous technical aspects. The information life cycle encompasses the stages of planning; **collection, creation or generation of information; its organization; retrieval, use, accessibility and transmission; storage and protection; and disposition.** The information life cycle provides the appropriate framework within which information is managed, causing a multiplier effect by injecting valid, solid and applicable information into COMEC’s decision-making cycle. Although military organizations each have their own information life cycles, there is a sort of generic structure. EC has 30 years of experience, participation in operations, a dual scope of action on behalf of NATO and the European Union, and a multinational character. These factors have allowed EC to define and develop an agile, effective, and efficient information life cycle that satisfies COMEC’s decision-making requirements.

Efficient IM can maximize the efficiency of the informa-





Personnel of the Signal Coy Lebach during Exercise Common Tenacity 2022



EUROCORPS INFORMATION CYCLE

tion cycle. Therefore, adequate IM must be well organized to optimally handle information throughout its life cycle, ensuring that it is in the right form and of sufficient quality to meet an organization's demands. Agile processes that are coordinated both vertically and cross-functionally, information management tools, periodic staff training, and the presence of a central staff body such as the DOS Branch with an overarching vision of the headquarters, are essential elements that contribute to satisfactory information management.

EC's constantly evolving information management has led to the development of a knowledge management (KM) system that benefits the functioning of the headquarters. KM tools, including after-action reviews, briefings, minutes from brainstorming sessions, among others, are concentrated as highlights in the EC Information Portal (ECIP) and the IKM matrix. The ECIP is an essential element for sharing and exchanging information and in developing collaborative work. The IKM Matrix, established for exercises and operations with productive

and positive outcomes, has put EC on track to become one of the most advanced HQs in this discipline. However, one distinctive feature that should not be overlooked is the multinational character of EUROCORPS, with its six Framework Nations and five Associated Nations – the former of which have equal weight and responsibility in decision-making processes. The development of an internal IM discipline is not solely attributable to NATO policy and doctrine; experts from the various nations have also made instrumental contributions.




Colonel Alberto GUDE MENÉNDEZ (ESP Army) currently serves as Director of Staff (DOS) at EUROCORPS HQ, a position he has held since 01 August 2021. In the course of his career, Colonel GUDE has held various assignments in Spain, including Chief of the 2nd Signal Section (III Regional Signal Unit), XXXII Engineers Battalion, 22nd Strategic Signal Regiment, and the Spanish Legion Brigade "Rey Alfonso XIII". As a General Staff Officer, he has served in several roles, including G3 and Chief of Staff at the Headquarters of the Spanish Signal Brigade, in the 21st Signal Regiment, in the NRDC-ESP (G6 Plans), and as Chief of Human Resources and Logistics in the Spanish Rapid Reaction Corps. From 2014 to 2017, he has served as G6 Plans at EUROCORPS. His operational experience includes multiple deployments to Kosovo, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Lebanon and twice to the Central African Republic, one of them as Chief of Staff of the mission. He has also completed various courses, including the Signal Specialist Course, the Electronic Warfare Specialist Course, the Joint General Staff Officer Course, and the Disaster Management Course with the Spanish Emergency Military Unit.

Any HQ requires a training road map to become operational and ready to fight. “Crawl, walk and run”: this is one of the main mottos within NATO, when we talk about preparation and training. To cover all training requirements to become a certified NATO JHQ, EC is pursuing its pace. First, “crawling” with academics, Key Leader Training (KLT), Functional Area Training (FAT), and Cross-functional Area Training (CFAT); second, “walking”, with a BST; and finally, “running”, with a Command Post Exercise (CPX) such as EX Steadfast Jackal 23.

NATO Bi-SC Directive 075-003 defines BST as collective training that is the culminating point of the “foundation training” stage - the foundation, the basement upon which we will build our HQ making it “walk” and eventually start “running”. Let us then focus now on Battle Staff Training (BST).

NATO considers collective training an activity designed to improve operational or procedural team proficiency through drills conducted under customized training conditions (few interactions; the product matters less than the process; limited time pressure and complexity), including the practical application of doctrines, plans and procedures, the acquisition and maintenance of tactical, operational and strategic capabilities.

Key Leader Engagement Meeting held during Exercise Common Tenacity 2022



As a collective training, BST is an event designed to maintain and improve the HQ's capabilities in mission-essential tasks comprising responsibilities from several functional areas. The aim of BST is the preparation of staffs for operations and exercises with a special focus on procedures and SOPs in connection with the desired battle rhythm.

BST provides the commanders with the opportunity to enhance the decision making process (working groups, boards, etc.) within the HQ. The commander will decide about the size and scope of the BST, and this, in turn, will determine which methods (i.e. vignettes, MEL/MIL) and tools (i.e. role players, mentors) should be used for the achievement of the commanders' aims. The com-

mander will also face the challenge of replicating as much as possible the stress, combat conditions, limitations, etc., that his staff and troops would experience in the battlefield, throughout a simulation design.

What is important to bear in mind is that BST is essentially focused on processes itself, not on the outcomes of the processes. Processes, battle drills, etc., such as, as for example, Battle Rhythm, are established and are necessary to ensure that all steps, conditions and factors for a good decision are taken into account and are synchronized with other ones to converge to a unique result. Through BST, we train to achieve mastery in the application of processes. Later on, we will pursue mastery in



THE IMPORTANCE OF BATTLE STAFF TRAINING (BST) THE CERTIFICATION AS JHQ

dealing with the results of the processes.

Normally, the BST is conducted at the Command Post(s) running a "light" Battle Rhythm. The complexity of this Battle Rhythm increases (through vignettes or MEL/MIL or others) as the training audience is familiarized further with the decision making process to be trained.

TRAINING THE HQ THROUGH BST IS DESIGNED TO ACHIEVE THE FOLLOWING RESULTS:

- Enhanced staff integration, greater cohesion.
- Enhanced staff's ability to run selected cross-functional area processes.
- Staff familiarized with reports and returns and related functional systems.
- Staff ready for the execution of Planning and Conduct of Operations ("walk to run" step).

Keeping in mind that the purpose of EC's main effort in 2023 is to develop a JHQ-integrated model (embedded option), this article focuses on describing and analyzing how we should prepare and execute our BST to succeed in STJA 23 Phase IIb (Execution) that will be the environment for our evaluation, certification and demonstrated capability to operate in a multi-domain environ-

ment. What are the main features of the BST that EC is going to carry out?

Let us have a quick view on our situation. EC is a Corps-size HQ that will assume the role of a JHQ in 2024. To go from the tactical level to the operational one, we need not only to change our land and tactical mindset but also to incorporate a significant number of personnel from the land forces and other services to complete our Crisis Establishment.

Additionally, our HQ rotates its personnel at an average of three years. This means that at least one third of our staff will be "new-comers" with no more than three months to face the EX STJA 23 execution phase and most likely without any joint experience.

EC has decided that the "embedded-integrated" model is the one that best fits for our purpose.

All of the above implies that, on the one hand, we have to implement our BST adapted very closely to, almost in line with, the execution phase to ensure that at least we will have available the manning, but without too much room for significant adaptations or refinement in the processes to be trained.

On the other hand, and although community of doctrine is quite widespread in the NATO world, it goes without saying that each HQ has its own particular procedures and that these differ from



others, let alone talking about different services. Therefore, people joining our HQ will not be familiar with EC HQ processes. This means that we will need to start with processes almost from scratch. Our BST essentially will then be focused on the processes and in some cases not on practicing them but on learning them.

Moreover, ensuring the Land Tactical Element integration into the operational HQ, the conformity of the integrated model and the integration of both battle rhythms perhaps will represent the main challenge. Different staff levels with different planning horizons and different BR timelines. Linking BRs is not an easy task, but it will allow for the synchronization of both the tactical and operational levels. Otherwise, if the higher echelon finalizes its BR cycle without giving the opportunity to the subordinate unit to provide its input after the application of its own cycle, the coordination and synchronization required won't be possible. Looking at Comprehensive Operational Planning Directive (COPD), you can observe that processes between different levels of planning are linked, so subordinate inputs reach the higher echelon before they produce their outputs, and that will be the same for conducting operations.

Along with this challenge, BST takes place in training facilities different from a day-to-day barracks environment, so even an adaption process in order to know where the different meeting rooms are located or where to find the correct contact persons is needed. Face-to-face interviews de-conflict more in 5 minutes than dozens of emails, but finding the correct contact person in a

600-personnel HQ is also a challenge most of the time.

In a nutshell, BST is like stretching before a race; if it is not done properly, the possibilities of lesions/ malfunctions increase. It has to be carefully prepared and monitored during execution and to apply the suitable and gradual intensity to make the HQ start the execution phase as a very well-oiled engine.

Concerning the certification process, it has to be pointed out that it is just the formal recognition that organizations, individuals, materiel or systems meet defined standards or criteria as demonstrated in the course of the evaluation process, that it is an objective and unbiased examination necessary to eliminate any doubt about the fulfilment of requirements. Based on the evaluation, the certification is implemented by way of an official statement of a subordinate unit or HQ Commander to the next higher-level Commander informing that forces and HQs under their command comply with Allied Force Standards and readiness requirements and are therefore capable of performing the assigned mission. All in all, it is comparable with the status of a student of medicine. You may be familiar with all the science, knowledge and practice in medicine, but until you have a degree, you cannot work as a doctor.

But let me remind you once more that what matters is that our HQ is ready to command and control the units assigned, to plan the operations, to provide advice to the upper echelon and to accomplish the mission. The evaluation and certification processes are just tools, never a goal.



Major General Rafael Colomer was born in Zaragoza in 1961. Over the course of his career, he has served in various infantry and intelligence units, as well as in headquarters as a staff officer.

He commanded an anti-tank company, an intelligence battalion, an armoured regiment and a brigade.

As Major General, he was Director of the Research, Doctrine, Organisation and Materiel Department of the Spanish TRADOC.

He completed several national and international courses related to operational planning and intelligence, as well as General Staff Courses (Spain & US). He also holds a law degree from the UNED (Spain).

He served in various missions and operations, the most prominent being his deployment to Bosnia-Herzegovina, Afghanistan and Lebanon.

He is fluent in English and Portuguese, and has notions of Italian and French.

He has been awarded several national and international distinctions.



In the context of the complex security and defense situation on our continent, EUROCORPS, located at the heart of Europe – and Spain as one of its Framework Nations, along with Germany, Belgium, France, Luxemburg and Poland – is taking on greater relevance by virtue of its multinational military capabilities.

On September 9, 2022, the Spanish Chief of Defence, Admiral Teodoro Esteban López Calderón, co-chaired the 30th anniversary celebrations of the European Rapid Reaction Corps, on behalf of Spain. In the presence of his colleagues from the other Framework Nations, he demonstrated not only the commitment of the Spanish Armed Forces to support a unique and professional Headquarters at the operational and tactical level, but also Spain's unwavering commitment to the security and defence of Europe and the North Atlantic region.

Though EUROCORPS as a headquarters is very similar to the other High Readiness Headquarters of the NATO Force Struc-

ture, it has some unique features. Firstly, its multinationality. This means that the contributions of the Framework Nations are reasonably balanced, with Spain being the third largest contributor after France and Germany. Secondly, is the so-called duality. This means that EUROCORPS is ready to act for both NATO and the EU. In 1993, the SACEUR Agreement allowed EUROCORPS to be placed under the command of NATO's Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR). Based on the Memorandum of Understanding signed in 2016 between EUROCORPS and the EU Military Staff, the Headquarters continues to foster mutual support.

Demonstrating operational readiness and achieving NATO certification time after time by meeting very demanding NATO standards, EUROCORPS has participated in various missions and operations under the NATO and EU banner. To these missions, Spain has contributed its fair share of highly qualified and prepared personnel stationed in Strasbourg.

EUROCORPS currently is implementing the mandate given to it by its highest political-military executive body, the

Common Committee, by reorganising its structure to deal more effectively with new scenarios and sorts of future conflicts, and by acquiring capabilities in new areas, increasing resilience, etc. At the same time, it is preparing for a new operational role in 2024 as NATO Joint Force Headquarters for a smaller joint and land-focused operation. Its next commitment is to prepare for missions as Forces Headquarters of the European Battle Group (EUBG) in 2025. As a fully operational military organisation, EUROCORPS stands ready to respond to new directives from framework nations, as a result of developments in the NATO Force Structure or new security and defence concepts in the EU. In this manner, Spain proves its unwavering commitment to international stability and security.

But behind EUROCORPS' military organisation is another very diverse human organisation, made up of the Spanish soldiers themselves - and those from 10 other countries - and their families, all ambassadors of their country, who will remain deeply marked by the experience of their placement with EUROCORPS. Every day,

SPAIN IN EUROCORPS

UNITY MAKES STRENGTH

MAJOR GENERAL RAFAEL COLOMER

our Spanish soldiers face the challenges of a demanding job in this multinational environment, with a working language other than their mother tongue, applying doctrine and procedures that may differ from what they are used to. Our families, especially the children, have to go to school and learn in a foreign language, some even learning a new language from scratch, and make new friendships that are so essential to anchor them in their new environment. Moreover, their mothers or fathers have to find ways to care for their children with different obligations, hours, habits, curricula and so many other things they have to get used to.

What an enriching experience for our servicemen, let alone for the lucky ones who make up their families! Many of them will return to Spain with the experience of having lived in this beautiful Strasbourg, a cozy, quiet and safe French city with an exquisite environment full of French and German influences. They will have learned French (plus English or German) and made new friends from other European countries they will never forget, with a broader and truer European outlook than before, and also with a strengthened cohesion among Spaniards. Finally, they



Spanish Chief of Defence, Admiral Teodoro Esteban López Calderón

will have a greater appreciation for all the things we have in Spain that we never really noticed because they were so readily available.

Thus, Spain not only actively contributes to the security and defence of Europe, but also provides its soldiers and their families with a fantastic opportunity to gain an enriching professional, cultural and human experience, giving them more opportunities and, as a result, making them better prepared to face the challenges of life that await them in the future. Thank you, Spain!



EUROCORPS ENGINEER TRAINING EXERCISE EURETEX 2024

EURETEX IS A LIVEX AT THE TACTICAL LEVEL and aims to foster and enhance interoperability among Engineers from EUROCORPS' Framework and Associated Nations and any other sending nations through the sharing of experiences, best practices and Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs). The domains and expertise that are rehearsed comprise the functional areas of sappers, divers, EOD (including K9), CBRN Defense and GEOINFO (MILGEO & METOC). Interoperability is all about people getting to know each other and working closely together, standardizing common procedures, and familiarizing themselves with one another's equipment. During the last edition in 2021, the EUROCORPS Engineers Branch brought together 450 participants from 13 different nations.

IN 2024, EURETEX WILL BE HELD FROM 07 UNTIL 24 JUNE AT THE DRAWSKO POMORSKIE TRAINING AREA (DPTA) IN POLAND. The 16th edition of the exercise provides the opportunity for Engineer units to deploy to Poland, to integrate and subsequently conduct common training. So far, only the Initial Planning Conference (IPC) was held from 18 until 20 April 2023 at Headquarters EUROCORPS, Strasbourg: 13 different nations agreed to participate in 2024.

Every other year, the EUROCORPS Engineer Branch plans and organizes an exercise open to military personnel from the Engineer corps of different countries. Any Engineers unit that has missed the call for participation and wishes to express interest in participating can still contact EUROCORPS for registration.

MILESTONE PLANNING SCHEDULE

Site Survey (Poland):	06 - 07 NOV 23
Main Planning Conference (MPC) in Poland:	08 - 10 NOV 23
Final Coordination Conference (Strasbourg):	19 - 21 FEB 24
Deployment of the Training Audience:	07 JUN 24
EURETEX 24 Execution (Phase III):	08 JUN - 21 JUN 2024
Distinguished Visitors Day and Industry Day:	18 JUN 2024
Redeployment of the Training Audience:	22-24 JUN 24

SHARING EXPERIENCES, Tactics, Techniques and Procedures and learning from each other are key in a multinational environment. Multinationality is EUROCORPS' strength. Moreover, EUROCORPS will continue to foster multinational cooperation.



EURETEX 2021



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ON THE COVER

A Ukrainian Soldier in Action at Polish-led Exercise "ANACONDA 2016" (AN16). AN16 transformed from a routine training event to an Alliance exercise with participation from NATO & partners, and gathering both the military and civilian sectors. A show of transatlantic unity with 14,000+ US & Canadian troops, AN16 highlighted the indivisibility of security.

At that time, Generals Ben Hodges (ex-COM USAREUR) and Sławomir Wojciechowski (ex-DCOM Polish Armed Forces Operational Command) played a crucial role in AN16's success.

In the Wake of Russia's unprovoked, unjustified aggression against Ukraine, international partners provide training to Ukrainian Armed Forces on European and transatlantic soil.

EUROCORPS salutes two tireless, and assiduous multi-hatted generals reunited in EPIC. Thank you for your valuable contribution to this issue!

Photo by Arkadiusz Dwuliatek / Zespół Reporterski "Combat Camera" Dowództwa Operacyjnego RSZ

CONTRIBUTIONS

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Penned with the international community in mind, it is intended to serve as a forum for the exchange of current opinions, ideas and highlights related to the security and defence domains.

DISCLAIMER

The views and opinions expressed in this publication are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the official policy or position of EUROCORPS and/or its member nations.

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